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ABSTRACT 
The following work seeks to demonstrate the ways in which a discipline's philosophical 
conception of science defines not only its method, but indeed, its entire academic structure. 
Traditionally, scientific empiricism has been viewed as the only legitimate conception of 
science within psychology, however, by challenging this view, it is found that empiricism 
represents a weak philosophical system upon which to base notions of rational inquily. It 
is further suggested that the alternative of realist philosophy and implicated method take its 
place. By way of an example, the latter half of the work acts to demonstrate the ways in 
which empiricism has defined a number of maladaptive constructions within the realm of 
sport psychology, and how an adoption of the realist alternative may enable a more 
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Introduction 
The practical links that exist between philosophy, science, and academic theory 
and practice are, in most views, at best, highly oblique. Commonly, philosophy is 
considered to represent an esoteric field of practice with little or no relevance to the actual 
projects of academics, scientists or clinicians operating within the 'real' world. Scientific 
method is often presumed to have been carried down from the mountain top along with the 
Ten Commandments by Moses; a fully formulated and immutable practice. In this sense, if 
one should be so bold as to raise questions regarding the appropriateness of this practice, 
no doubt the reactions of those involved in this area would be less than positive. Indeed, 
often scientists or practitioners insist that their interests are not in the 'extraneous' levels of 
philosophical debate regarding the adequacy of their procedures, but rather in the area of 
the practical; in "doing something". Such a view posits the usefulness of practice, as 
opposed to the relative uselessness of discourse regarding practice. 
Perhaps because of this perception, that to examine the machinations of a 
philosophical view and its consequent methodology is not, in itself, a legitimate or practical 
exercise; it is not in itself 'doing something', any discussion of philosophy within the realm 
of science has tended to have been treated with scant regard. Perhaps little more than a 
passing reference in a methods paper, or as an historical perculiarity within a brief 
overview of a subject. However, as this thesis will attempt to foreground, rather than 
being a mere exercise in tt.ivia, the examination of the links between science, philosophy, 
and academic practice are indeed crucial to the actual results of such practice. Indeed, it is 
the examination of the philosophy(s) upon which any particular methodological procedure 
is based that often renders up areas within that method which clearly are working to 
undermine, or illegitimate, any claims that it may be attempting to assert towards the 
grounds of 'truth', 'meaning', or 'scientific fact'. 
Further to this, it is also important to remember in this area of discussion that, 
although indisputably useful, science can never be said to offer a means of attaining a 
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position of total truth. For indeed, just as religious systems of belief once operated as the 
central foundations upon which our knowledge of the world were built, but have since 
been largely undermined by the postulations of scientific activity, so too is it possible to 
conceive of a situation in which science, in turn, is undermined by another competing 
discourse. In the same way that religious philosophies, when recognised as such, have 
been replaced by a more cognitive, rather than spiritual, interpretation of reality, so too is it 
perhaps possible for this to occur in the realm of science. Indeed, it would seem important 
that in order to continue to be of practical use in the world, science should constantly 
examine and re-examine its philosophical bases and actively discourage the prevailing view 
that there is somehow a naturalness, or essential truth in its discussions of reality, the 
world , or human behaviour. Thus, as this thesis will discuss, science is a system like any 
other that has developed over the course of civilisation and is founded upon philosophies 
which may, or may not, be useful for representing and explaining the world. 
In order to be of practical use, then, it would seem pertinent for us to examine 
some of the central tenets of mainstream scientific practice. In this way, as I have 
suggested above, science may continue to hone its pragmatic methodological tools for the 
purpose of accurately achieving its aim of delineating the nature of reality. During the 
course of this thesis I will place the very notion of science itself under the microscope of 
inquiry in order to show how a discussion of the philosophies at play within any particular 
conception or discourse may have profound implications for the academic practices and 
procedures that it informs. 
Thus, it is to the adequacy of empiricism, as the incumbent and dominant system 
of "science" that our attention shall initially be turned. Representing by far the most widely 
practiced methodology of science, as we will see, it is wholly based upon the assumption 
that all behaviour - animate or inanimate - and all operations of reality, may be 
unproblematically observed and recorded by the objective figure of the scientist, or 
clinician, who is able to interpret this data with the minimum of extraneous difficulties. 
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The most difficult area of conjecture within the practice of empiricism lies in its dualistic 
view of reality, a view which rests upon a philosophical foundation which, as I shall argue, 
seems largely untenable in any practical or useful manner. We may look at the wider 
assumptions of dualistically determined empiricism using the figure of Zeno's paradox 
regarding the flight path of an arrow: for just as it is impossible to stop an arrow in mid-
flight in order to examine how it flies, so too is it impossible for the scientist or clinician to 
somehow disregard his or her subjective state in order to make so-called objective 
postulations about an object's behaviour. Indeed, just as an arrow, once stopped, is no 
longer the same arrow observed flying, neither is it possible to hypothesize about reality if 
subjectivity, a function and state of reality, is removed. Furthermore, as I will argue, there 
can be no state in which subjectivity may be said to have been effectively "removed". This, 
like Zeno's example, is a paradox. 
In the light of the existence of such metaphysical dilemmas within the dominant 
scientific paradigm, and the consequential effects that such problems present for disciplines 
wishing to imbue themselves with the legitimation science is thought to confer, our analysis 
thus turns to the potentials of other, less contradictory and problematic, philosophical 
conceptions of science. In this regard, analysis now turns to the adequacy of the theory of 
realism. 
As a philosophy, realism represents a more unified, coherent and reasonable 
discourse upon the structure of the world, our relationship to it, and the consequent nature 
of the practices that are found to be appropriate within this relationship. Rather than 
denying the "limitations" of human knowledge, and thereby creating for itself the 
inescapable paradoxes of the order Zeno revels in presenting to us, realist philosophy 
founds itself instead upon an analysis of the content of such "limitations". In this way, a 
picture of human existence is created that reflects, in some substantial or relevant way, 
what our knowledge stmctures may "tmly" be said to represent and how their generation 
may best be understood, and thus, unde1taken. 
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Consequently, realisms analysis of the intersubjective foundations of meanin~ and 
the generative causal strncture of the world, come to redefine the methods and objectives of 
rational inquiry. That is, the philosophy of realism comes to redefine what may be 
appropriately conceived of as representing the notion of science. 
In turn, the adequacy of this realist philosophical construction of science is 
examined by reference to contemporary poststructuralist developments in the theory of 
knowledge. While it is contended here that such developments themselves suffer from 
inadequacies in their conceptualisation, most particularly in Denida's total disjunction 
between the never ending "chain of signification" and the world in which we exist; it is still 
suggested that certain elements of poststructural theory may be beneficially employed 
without necessruily compromising realisms metaphysics. 
In order that the largely theoretical nature of this foregoing discussion may be 
grounded, so as to draw more sharply into focus the dramatic impact of philosophical 
discourse upon a disciplines historical development, methodological and theoretical 
perspectives, and research interests, section two of the text concentrates upon the 
implications that both empiricism and realism hold for sport psychology. Initially it is 
shown how historically empiricism has shaped the disciplines structures, ultimately 
producing the fractious splintering of it members into two distinct, and largely opposing 
groups. 
Discussion then draws upon how realisms alternative philosophical perspective of 
science enables the two competing sub-disciplines of sport psychology to be positioned 
such that their opposing methods and goals are in fact shown to be complimentary in 
nature. It thereby suggests how they might be reunited within a single framework in a 
viable and productive working relationship. Within this working relationship, particular 
reference is then paid to the privileged position that sport psychology holds in overcoming 
many of the fundamental problems that the conceptually relational nature of human 
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behaviour poses to its experimental examination. Finally, a brief reference is paid to 




Psychology And The Nature Of Science: 
Empiricism ... Realism ... and Beyond? 
The nature of science. 
Over the course of the past one hundred years, "science" has increasingly come to 
be seen, by most people living within the Western world, as our best and most legitimate 
means of coming to understand the nature of reality, or of establishing the "truth of 
things". Previous to this, it was to the doctrines of religious scriptures that people most 
often turned for the answers to the questions that the world around them posed. 
Unsurprisingly then, as the natural sciences have grown, our secular driven understandings 
of the world have increasingly come to define the character of our cultme, our society and 
of "us" as individuals within these structures. However, despite the dramatic impact 
science has undoubtedly had upon the direction of humankind throughout the course of this 
century, attempts to define what exactly it is, how it works, or why it is apparently so 
successful, have thus far proven to be as notoriously difficult as our attempts to define the 
previous belief system of religion that it has, arguably, superseded in many areas. 
In everyday understandings, the practice of science is unproblematically taken to 
be synonymous with the practice of the natural sciences. "Science", then, is simply 
thought to be what physicists, chemists and biologists "do". But what such people do and 
what makes their practice and the knowledge derived from it unique and distinctive from 
other fo1ms of practice and knowledge is a subject upon which philosophers, from the time 
of Plato to the present, have been largely unable to agree. Perhaps because of this, the 
representation of science within psychology has typically failed to go far beyond the 
uncritical, everyday conceptualization's expressed above. Indeed, it is contended here that 
this evidently circular understanding of science is largely responsible for the inability of 
contemporary psychology to critically assess its own scientific adequacy and also for the 
common misrepresentation of the historical development of psychology as a scientific 
discipline. 
If we are to examine what most historical analyses of the progression of 
psychology have stated, we find an almost unanimous agreement amongst writers that, as a 
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discipline, psychology either became a science, or at least attempted to become a science, 
when it consciously decided to adopt the methods and procedures of the natural sciences. 
Thus, it is widely believed that when psychologists began to "do" what physicists, 
chemists and biologists "do", their discipline - by definition - became a "science". The next 
step of this common analysis has, of course, been to note that in a number of significant 
ways, psychologists do not "do" what their natural science counterparts do, and thus the 
question as to whether or not psychology may validly be considered to represent a science 
is raised anew. Fmthermore, in the absence of a more effective conception of science, this 
question, and the whole adequacy of psychology's current programme, remains 
unanswerable. 
We must thus look to some of the philosophical understandings of what science is 
if we are ever to understand the proper role and function of this construct within 
psychology. The first benefit of such an approach is that it enables a full recognition of the 
inadequacies of the currently popular historical understanding outlined above. For 
psychology never consciously adopted the practices of the natural sciences but rather, the 
underlying philosophy by which such practices were thought to be made scientific. 
Many writers have pointed out that psychology modelled itself upon 
the natural sciences ... , but in fact psychology did nothing of the 
kind; rather it modelled itself upon an essentially empiricist account 
of the logic of scientific reasoning. 
(Greenwood, 1983,p.237) 
Thus, the fact that there exists some departure from an exact mirroring of the 
practices of the natmal sciences is neither surprising, nor does it threaten the notion of 
psychology as a science. For as long as its practice is consistent with its empiricist 
philosophical foundations, then scientific psychology remains a tenable proposition. The 
most crucial area of critical evaluation, in terms of assessing "science" and scientific 
practice then, lies not directly in the particular methods and procedmes adopted, but rather 
in the adequacy of the philosophical conceptualisation that makes such methods and 
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procedures scientific. In the case of psychology it is thus to the adequacy of empiricism, 
or neopositivism, that we must attend in order to assess the feasibility of psychology as a 
scientific discipline. 
Empiricism 
Empiricism, as a philosophical doctrine, in fact, encompasses a wide spectrum of 
divergent viewpoints, or considerations, of the exact nature of the world and of scientific 
practice. This range extends from the harshest of the Skinnerian behaviourist conceptions 
to the more flexible, or "liberal", neopositivist formulations of recent times. While, like 
most philosophies, it does not speak with a single unified voice, certain themes common to 
all the various schools are readily identifiable and may justifiably be said to represent the 
essential features of all systems classified under the general rubric of empiricism. 
Dualism 
Most central to all empiricist formulations is the dualistic concept of the "objective 
world" as a distinct and separate entity from that of the "subjective world". By invoking 
this form of cartesian dualism it is argued that science is the practice of discovering the 
objective by an elimination of the confounding illusions of the subjective "mind". The 
implications of this dualist understanding of reality are profound, for they suggest a whole 
plethora of related dualisms upon which the majority of positivist scientific practice is 
based. These include, for example, the epistemological division of the world into strictly 
true-false, factual-hypothetical, quantitative-qualitative, rational-moral and sensory-
perceptual categories. 
The critical aspect of this assumption is not the existence of two related, yet 
autonomous, realms per se, but rather the belief that it is possible to escape one realm in 
order to exist in the other. In other words, that we may establish true, factual and 
preferably quantitative knowledge of reality by "dwelling in" the sensory world of the 
objective, rather than in the subjective, perceptual world of our everyday, unscientific 
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lives. This "escape" is thought to be made possible by the presumed seqyential nature of 
human perception, which is believed to allow us access to conceptually unmediated 
sensory experiences. Since empiricism proposes that the sensations we experience are 
only subsequentially conceptually mediated, thereby giving rise to our perceptions, it is 
further postulated that we may attend to these sensations prior to the "interference" of this 
mediating, subjective element. Sensations are thus thought to be somehow intrinsically 
meaningful and wholly representative of the objective world, and can therefore be 
conceived of as constituting the "basic units" of our objective, scientific understandings 
and knowledge of the world. 
Currently more popular within empiricist thinking is a somewhat "softened" 
version of the above conceptualisation of perception in which it is suggested that the 
perceptual process may also possess a subjective element which exists prior to the sensate 
being experienced. This subjective element is believed to exist in the form of pre-existing 
theories that we hold about an object. Such theories are conceived of as necessarily 
directing our attention, or observations, towards seeing those particular sensates associated 
with the object that are related to the theory we currently hold about it. That is, the 
sensations we receive will necessarily be biased by the pre-existing theories we hold about 
the object in question. However, by retaining a sequential view of perception, the sensate 
may still be retained as the intrinsically meaningful "basic unit" of scientific knowledge, for 
the "subjective problem" of selective attention created by the presence of such pre-existing 
theories is thought to be resolvable by way of the employment of quasi-control techniques 
such as placebos, control groups, double blind experimenters and so forth - the rationale 
being that if you do not know the "current theory/hypothesis", then your observations 
cannot be biased by it. This particular permutation of the empiricist argument is, under 
these terms, believed to answer many of positivism's critics by supposedly demonstrating 
that an acknowledgement of the "theory laden" nature of the perceptual process does not 
necessarily require us to surrender the possibility of "sensory observation". In fact, it will 
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be argued, this point of view remains as problematic as all dualistic formulations that have 
been constructed along empiricist lines. 
While the distinction between sensation and perception appears to be useful in 
terms of aiding our understandings of the physical and neurological basis of perception -
that is, in helping us to conceptualise the temporal sequence of energy transduction from its 
origin as reflected light through to its subsequent representation as electrochemical activity 
along the optic pathways and then on to its final emission as "sensation" in the optical-
cortical region of the brain - attempting to maintain this same distinction at the non-reduced 
level of integrated human perceptual behaviour becomes entirely untenable. It is simply not 
the case that we experience a sensation and then conceptually attend to it. Rather, a 
"referent" and its sense relations are so intimately bound together that in a very real way we 
actually learn to see the world in particular ways. We do not passively build reflections of 
"reality" but instead actively create schema in order that we can discriminate our perceptual 
world in a way that is meanin&ful to us. As Pratt(l 980) puts it, 
.. .far from labelling pre-discriminated entities, our concepts make their 
discrimination possible.(p.53) 
Typically, such conceptual mediation within perception is so deeply habituated 
that we are totally unaware of its presence, thereby creating the common illusion that it 
does not in fact exist at all, and subsequentially, allowing the emergence of the sensation-
perception dualism. However, as O'Connor and Carr (1982) have noted, the very 
expression in language of any visual experience, no matter how primitive (for example, "I 
see yellow"), demonstrates that a conceptual element is always present, even though we are 
seldom consciously aware of it. When confronted by a task, or situation, that is in some 
way novel however, this conceptual element typically becomes strikingly apparent to us. 
For example, if shown an electronmicroscopic photograph of the cross-section of the 
nerve-ending of a hair cell within the cochlea, it is highly unlikely that we will actually 
"see" anything other than some apparently random blotches and squiggles, unless we have 
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had prior expe1ience with such photographs and anatomical structures. However, note that 
once we are familiar with identifying such structures, we will almost certainly forget that 
we have in fact kfil:nt to make such discriminations. 
The conceptual aspect of perception is then inescapable. If we were we somehow 
able to free ourselves from it, our experience would be essentially "unhuman". It would 
represent a denial of our basic human quality, or necessity, to impose conceptual form and 
order onto the world of experience, and would leave us with only a bizarre kaleidoscope of 
random uninterpretable (or uninterpreted) lights, shapes and forms. Every observation, 
then, is instantaneously the product of both physical stimulation and conceptual saturation, 
to the point where to speak of one without the other is utterly nonsensical. By refusing to 
acknowledge the extent of such conceptual saturation, or the meanin&s that attend our 
various observations, scientific empidcism has chosen to ignore a basic reality of human 
existence. 
The impact of this ignorance is profound, not only directly upon the feasibility of 
the observational method that it info1ms, but also with respect to the tenability of the whole 
dualistic structure upon which this observational method is founded. For, by denying the 
possibility of "sensatory based" observation, empiricism is effectively precluded from 
entering the "objective world" of absolute truth and facts in which it claims to "dwell", and 
thus of unproblematically distinguishing the sorts of clear-cut true-false, rational-moral, 
significant-insignificant dualisms that it posits underlie our knowledge systems. 
Reductionism 
Beyond this, at best, highly dubious dualistic framework, empiticism's second 
most readily identifiable feature lies in its universal commitment to reductionism as the 
most appropriate means for understanding the world - with a con-esponding preference 
towards quantification for this same reason. 
Reductionism, simply stated, combines two basic beliefs within a single method, 
or philosophical perspective, that may then be applied in order to facilitate, or enable, our 
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understanding of complex objects and situations. These two beliefs are, firstly; that any 
complex whole is fully explicable in terms of the combined additive nature of its 
component parts; and secondly, that the further, or more fundamental, the reductionist 
disaggregation you achieve, the more fundamental, or full, is your consequent 
understanding of the complex whole in which you are interested. Thus, for example, if we 
were to decompose some biological event into its constituent chemical elements, determine 
the relationship between these elements, and then add our knowledge of these 
disaggregated units together, we would not only have achieved a full description of the 
biological event but also a better, or more fundamental, understanding of it. Ideally then, 
the subject matter of all the disciplines, ranging from sociology at the top of the traditional 
"subject hierarchy" through to psychology, biology, chemistry and finally onto physics at 
the bottom, is thought to be ultimately explicable in terms of the fundamental relationships 
present within this final discipline. That is, by way of reductionist principles, the entire 
subject matter of psychology is thought to be fully representable in the generalised laws of 
physics - and indeed this is considered to be our ultimate, if greatly distant, goal. 
While such elemental disaggregation is undoubtedly useful to us on many 
occasions, the question of whether or not it can yield a full understanding and explanation 
of complex higher-order behaviours remains a widely contested issue. Indeed, it is 
commonly argued that often complex aggregations of simpler components exhibit the 
property of emergence, whereby, as a whole, the complex structure possesses qualities and 
characteristics that transcend those of its constituent parts. Thus, for example, it may be 
argued that the conglomeration of neural cells and tissues that together comprise the human 
brain, when functioning as a whole, give rise to qualities of the human mind that are 
ill'educible to those of its component units. 
We would not try to explain the power of people to think by reference to the cells 
that constitute them, as if cells possessed this power too.(Sayer,1984,pp.108-
109) 
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The property of emergence may then be seen to effectively invalidate the 
reductionist programme. The notion that objects have emergent powers that are irreducible 
to their components further informs us that the world is not only differentiated, but also 
stratified. Indeed, the subject hierarchy outlined above represents a coarse gradation of the 
various stratum that are thought to exist within the world, and thus explains why each 
discipline expresses the degree of autonomy that it clearly does. 
The most practical consequence of this stratification of the world is simply that 
objects can, and should, be understood at their own leveVstratum, without necessarily 
requiring us to regress back through all their successive constituent strata. For example, 
social behaviour exists at a different strata to that of its constituent biological foundations. 
A "micro"/reductionist regress back into the biological constituents of a particular social 
action, though potentially useful, will not explain that person's meanin~ful behaviour for 
us - for meaningful action is an emergent power neither existing nor explicable at the 
stratum of biology. Potentially more useful would be a macro-regress considering the 
individual within the structures of the society in which the action takes place and in which 
meaning is constructed and reproduced. 
Further, it should be noted that empiricism's commitment to this maladaptive 
brand of reductionist reasoning is strongly identified with its even more highly contentious 
promotion of quantification within social research. While this promotion is in fact the 
product of a highly integrated set of empiricist beliefs - this being one of the chief 
difficulties involved in clearly and concisely representing its inadequacies - reductionisms 
natural attraction towards quantification, or the reduction of complex behaviours and 
interactions into the precise and unambiguous language of mathematics, may be seen to 
promote a number of the inappropriate quantitative strategies currently evident within 
psychology. 
The most readily apparent of these concern the common practice of quantifying 
social systems, or behaviours, seeking out correlations between different aspects, or 
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variables, evident within these systems, and then ruranging the correlations derived in such 
a way as to try and "explain" the behaviours under investigation. The denial of 
stratification and the irreducible nature of emergent powers however, here encourages the 
production of correlatory evidence that takes no account of the vruious stratum upon which 
each of the variables may exist, and thus produces a proliferation of essentially 
meaningless correlatory data that serves no real purpose other than to confuse, rather than 
clarify, our understanding. 
Even more fundamentally than this, however, is the fact that by ignoring the 
emergent properties of social phenomenon, reductionism actively encourages the 
widespread oversight, amongst empiricist researchers, of the many practical constraints 
that exist to the rampant quantification of the subject matter of psychology. For typically 
we find that social abstractions that capture some necessary aspect of social, or 
psychological, reality are rarely suitable for easy quantification or mathematical modelling. 
For example, even though Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen(1971) points out that for an object 
to be quantified it must, at its fundamentals, be qualitatively invariant across contexts - that 
is, that it must retain its essential character independently of the context in which it is placed 
at any point in time - we find that most reseru·chers regulru·ly quantify such qualitatively 
variable objects with very little appreciation of the problems this involves. Thus, context-
dependent phenomenon such as opinions, attitudes and intelligence ru·e regularly subjected 
to "measurement" upon interval scales to which they are ill-suited. Again, this practice is 
apparently due to the misguided belief that such quantitative disaggregation, or reduction, 
is not only legitimate, but the best means by which to understand such constructs. 
Humean Causation 
This concept of additive understanding leads us onto our third, and final, defining 
characteristic of empiricist philosophy; this being its commitment to the Humean 
conception of causation. Humean causation may be seen to have developed out of two 
philosophical trends, the first involving philosophy's traditional difficulty in dealing 
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effectively with the structure of inductive logic, and secondly, from empiricism's 
commitment to "reductionist atomism".(Meikle,1979,p.138) The problem of induction 
may be thought of as representing our inability to validly infer from the fact that two events 
have always been conjoined in the past, that they will always be similarly conjoined in the 
future, solely on the basis of our past experience. The problem may be better illustrated by 
reference to the example of the Christmas turkey, who, having noticed that the rising sun is 
always associated with the arrival of the farmer bringing food, induces that the former 
causes the latter. The fallacy of such reasoning is however drawn into sharp focus for the 
animal when, on Christmas day, the farmer arrives carrying not food, but an axe! This 
then is said to represent the "big problem of induction"(Harre & Madden,1975,pp.6,110); 
that is, that the world may, at any point in time, suddenly change completely from the way 
it presently behaves. 
This "big problem" presents particular difficulties for the atomistic form of 
reductionism posited by empiricism. This is because its assertion which holds that all 
relations between atoms are contingent (in the same way that the relationship that existed 
between the sun rise and the farmer's behaviour was contingent), and that all other 
behaviour is merely the sum total of such atomistic relations, means that it follows that all 
the behaviours and events witnessed in the world are also contingent in nature. Thus, at 
any point in time, any regular relationship may cease to exist, from the sun rising in the 
morning, to the bus always being five minutes late. 
In the atomistic framework ... the 'big problem of induction' presents itself at 
every moment, not just as a threat but as an actuality ... (Sayer,1984,p.142) 
These concems, then, basically reflect the issues represented within the Humean 
conception of causality, and the problems that the method it suggests attempts to resolve. 
At this level, empiricism asserts that the notion of "cause" as a productive, or generative, 
agent is entirely false. For although we may think that such causes exist, in actuality, all 
that we really observe is the constant conjunction of contingently related variables. 
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Lacking the concept of "cause" to pursue, it is then to the prediction and description of 
such "constant conjunctions" that empiricism actively attends. For given that we cannot 
causally explain a behaviour or system, then our best means of understanding it becomes 
one of simply describing and predicting its operation as it presently stands. Explanation is 
simply thought to refer to the generality of observed relationships. It involves the 
description of how widespread, or enduring, such relationships appear to be, rather than of 
why they (causally) exist. Under these te1ms, explanation and prediction are considered to 
be symmetrical, or equivalent, for to achieve one requires the achievement of the other. 
Consequently, the immediate goal of science, as our human mode of developing greater 
understanding, becomes the creation of "instrumentalist laws" (that is, predictive laws) that 
accurately describe the empirical regularities existing in the world of the order "If 'A', then 
'B'". 
The problem of how such laws may be derived, given positivism's legitimate 
denial of inductive reasoning, is widely thought to be resolved by the enormously 
influential work Karl Popper, and in particular, his analysis of the role of deductive logic 
within social science. Unlike induction, deduction represents a valid form of inference; the 
conclusions of a deductive argument cannot be rejected without contradiction as long as the 
premises are accepted. By proposing that science is necessarily deductive in form, Popper 
believed that he had successfully circumvented inductivism's "big problem"; for the 
presence of regularities could now be established, or at least provisionally accepted (on the 
grounds that there existed no good reason to reject them), by reference to future, 
predictable events, rather than by reference to past events. 
The deductive method advocated by Popper, termed Hypothetico-Deductivism 
(H-D method), proposes that scientists must establish theories, or hypotheses, from which 
testable predictions can be deduced. Such predictions are subsequentially empirically 
"tested" in order that their occun-ence or non-occun-ence may serve to indicate whether or 
not we can legitimately accept, or believe, the premises upon which these predictions were 
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based. Thus, the essential feature of this method lies in that it allows an important 
asymmetry to be established that does not exist for inductive inferences; this being, that 
while an affirmation of the test does not prove the premises to be coITect, a denial, or 
falsification, does show them to be in some way incorrect. At the root of H-D method then 
lies a falsificationist procedure in which a theories "strength" is seen to be determined 
entirely by its inability to be falsified. 
While elegant in its simplicity, and impenetrable within its internal logic, Popper's 
falsificationist methodology ultimately generates vicious paradoxes which significantly 
limits its final practicality. The most readily apparent of these being that, although based 
upon the metaphysical assumption of contingent "causation", actual falsifications are only 
of any lasting theoretical significance if we presuppose that some relations in the world are 
in fact necessary in nature. This is because there exists little value in falsifying some 
relationship today that we may equally "verify" tomorrow. The paradox this presents for 
Popper's falsificationist thesis is that in order to achieve its goal, it must accept what it 
originally wishes to deny. The "logic of science", unfortunately, cannot evade the 
problems that exist at the metaphysical level of necessity! 
Equally, we should note that if our only means of evaluating theories is through 
their falsification, this leaves us with the situation where all theories are either falsified, or 
not yet falsified; and within this latter category, with no valid means of prefe1Ting one 
theory over another. Thus, we can have no more confidence in our most successful 
theories than we can in our newly generated, and as yet unfalsified, theories. 
The Scientific Status Of Empiricist Psychology 
Given the foregoing account of empiricism's structure and associated difficulties, 
we may now return to examine more directly whether this philosophy represents, firstly, 
an adequate conceptualisation of the construct of "science", and secondly, whether by 
founding itself upon this philosophical tradition, psychology has successfully defined its 
current practice as being "scientific". Attending to the first of these questions, it should by 
22 
now be readily apparent that there exists significant, inherent weaknesses within 
empiricism's triad of founding epistemological assumptions - that is, within cartesian 
dualism, atomistic reductionism, and Humean causation - that make it highly problematic 
as a legitimate conceptualisation of "science". The reality of human existence is that all 
knowledge is the product of our subjective, conceptually negotiated, meaningful 
experiences; the world in which we live is stratified and thus only structurally, and not 
"explanatorily" reducible; and finally, given the two aforementioned features, that causation 
may clearly be conceived of as the productive, generative agent that our "common sense" 
informs us it is. While its denial of these truths has allowed empiricist thinking to create a 
f01midable argument for the prejudicial privileging of its own exclusive brand of "scientific 
knowledge" - for who can deny the superiority of knowledge that claims to be absolutely 
rational, objective and "true"? - the foregoing analysis enables us to recognise that this 
strength is in fact derived exclusively from its proffering of a world view that simply does 
not exist. By consphing to deny the actuality of our subjective existence, empiricism has 
merely acted to create a more conveniently structured, though essentially fictitious, picture 
of reality for its suggested methodology to understand. The clear consequence of this 
ontological misrepresentation is that as a philosophy, or scientific method, its adequacy for 
comprehending the reality of the world in which we ,dQ exist, is negligible. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn with reference to the second part of the 
question posed above, is that psychology, as a scientific discipline, cannot be established 
through an ascription to the ill-founded tenets of empiricist philosophy. Thus, the current 
practice of psychology is, by definition, not scientific. This, however, is not to deny the 
possibility of a scientific psychology, for if we accept the initial premise, that it is the 
philosophy which lies behind our overt methodologies that is what defines them as being 
scientific, then the potential for a more adaptive, or robust, philosophical alternative to this 
present conception of science still exists. We should, perhaps, further note at this point, 
that our initial premise also infers that the rejection of empiricist philosophy does not 
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necessarily make all the methodology empiricism advocates automatically redundant, for 
many of the strategies it proposes may still be intelligible within an alternative position. It 
is to the potential of such a position that we shall now turn. 
Realism 
While many alternatives have been constructed to the attenuated world view 
formulated by empiricist thinking, including, for example, various extremes of relativism, 
linguistic theory, structural-materialist propositions, and so forth; the most promising 
school of thought thus far forwarded within contemporary philosophy of science is, I 
believe, that of Realism. Realist theory stands in sharp contrast to the muddled 
metaphysics of empiricism by clearly positing two key assumptions concerning the nature 
of the world and our relationship to it. The first of these represents realism's belief that 
there exists one, single, unified epistemology - this being that of the intersubjective - while 
the second assumption suggests that real, necessary causal structures and agents are 
contained within the independently present physical world in which we all live. 
The lntersubjective 
By positing a non-dualistic, unified epistemological theory of knowledge, realism 
clearly confronts the often uncomfortable issue of the subjective nature of human 
experience. That is, that all human knowledge is bound within a subjective frame of 
interpretive meaning and understandings. How this position may be maintained without 
the common redress to relativism, solipsism, and "anti-science", may be demonstrated by 
an examination of the analysis realism forwards concerning the structures of human 
knowledge and their relationship to the material and social world. 
At an ontological level, realism contends that the physical world is an 
independently present, real entity. If a tree falls in the forest and no-one is there to hear it, 
under these terms, it definitely does make a sound! Non-social objects and their 
behaviours, exist totally independently of our knowledge of them, they are completely 
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impervious to the meanings we attach to them, and thus, while they are socially defined, 
they are not socially produced. Definition and production are utterly different. 
Taking this insight, it is further contended that, although our knowledge of this 
externally present world can only ever be gained through the imperfect processes of human 
perception and cognition, the practical limitations imposed upon us by the necessa,y ways 
of behaving of this external referent radically redefines the nature of this disjuncture 
between the material world and the world of thought, from that of the traditional, non-
interactive, relativist interpretations of the past. For it is precisely because definition and 
production are different that not any definition of an object, or process, will suffice. If we 
wish to cross a body of water, we are not able to simply redefine the properties of water in 
order that we might then be able to walk across it. Rather, our definition, or 
understanding, of water, and of all other physical properties in the world, must in some 
way grasp the constraints that they place upon us. As Bhaskar(1979) notes, while the 
nature of objects does not determine the content of our knowledge, it does determine their 
cognitive and practical possibilities for us.(p.31) Consequently, understanding, or "truth", 
becomes a practical issue, and indeed, Sayer(1984), speaks of the "practical adequacy", or 
functionality, of knowledge.(p.62) The test of human knowledge thus becomes one of 
how well its conceptualisation enables us to operate within the practical constraints the 
"external" world imposes, and not (necessarily) of how accurately it maps, or reflects, this 
external structure in any "absolute" way. 
Our conceptualization's then are based upon our consciously, interactive 
relationship with the commonly present world in which all humankind exists. Concepts of 
"truth" are founded upon pragmatic concerns, with practically adequate knowledge, such as 
"the world is round" being maintained, and practically inadequate concepts, such as "the 
world is flat", being dropped. Because such understandings are shared, and their practical 
adequacy publically available for all to examine/experience, systems of knowledge and 
understanding come to be ne~otiated between individuals. A commonality of 
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understanding is insured by the pragmatic foundations of knowledge to which we are all 
equally subject. Thus, as "subjective" understandings come to be shared, "inter-
subjective", negotiated frames of reference come to be established. Within contemporary 
society this intersubjective frame of reference refers to the extensive structures of 
communication - that is, verbal and non-verbal language - that exist independently of any 
single individual, but in which we are all constituted. 
It is because of this that all human thought and understanding is not simply 
individuated, subjective and relativist in nature, as dualism would suppose, for all thought 
is bound within a shared conceptual framework of intersubjectively negotiated meanings. 
We cannot think, or conceive, of the world in a totally unique way, but only through the 
systems of meaning that are publically and "objectively" available to us all. In this way, 
.. .it is not the speaker who directly imparts meaning to his utterances, but the 
linguistic system as a whole which produces it.(my emphasis, Jefferson & 
Robey, 1982, p.95) 
From this analysis, it should now also become clear that there in turn exists a 
fundamental difference between our understandings of the physical world, and those of the 
social world. For while, as outlined above, the meanings we impose upon the material 
structures of the world in no way affect their actual nature, in the case of social reality, the 
opposite is found to be true. While our understanding of the social is still constituted in our 
shared intersubjective frame of reference, and thus cannot be unilaterally or individually 
altered, the effects of its shared, collectively negotiated alterations are profound, for they 
actually change the nature of the object in question. Thus, if our intersubjective frame of 
reference were adjusted so that "sp01t" came to mean only, competitive swimming, then 
this is what "sport" would "be". If, however, it were intersubjectively agreed that the 
moon were made of green cheese, then the moon would still be comprised of whatever 
"astro-substance" it was before we altered our conceptualisation of it! Hence, whereas 
physical action is inherently meaningks£, all human action is inherently meaningful._All 
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the actions we pe1form are imbued with pre-existin~ meanings, which, if we wish to 
understand the behaviour of others, must be understood. (Note, however, that as we 
typically share the same intersubjective system of meaning, this task is often no more 
problematic than simply asking the person being studied what his/her intentions and 
understandings were.) 
The implications of this fundamental difference, in terms of realism's conception 
of the scientific study of these two differently structured phenomena, are profound. For 
whereas in the study of non-social objects there exists only one frame of meaning, that of 
the investigator, in the study of social objects, two frames of meaning must be considered. 
Firstly, that of the investigator's interpretations, and secondly, that of the actor's 
interpretations and intended meanings. Thus the physical sciences may be said to involve a 
single hermeneutic whereas the social sciences involve a double hermeneutic. 
By traditionally treating the social world in a reified manner, such that its 
structures are considered to be as fixed and rigidly independent as those of the physical 
world, our current "scientific" method has marginalised the importance of the double 
hermeneutic, and thus, the meanings and intentions of the individuals it seeks to 
understand. By recognising the importance of such intentionality, realism critically infmms 
current method as to the need for greater qualitative understandings, in which the meaning 
of social actions are given at least equal prominence as other causal aspects of the context. 
Note that this realist denial of reification has been of particular significance in the 
growth of emancipatory "critical themy", in which the objective of study is not to develop a 
"stock of knowledge" about an object or societal structure, but rather to examine its roots in 
the intersubjective understandings that maintain it, and that may ultimately change it. 
Generative Causation 
Just as this initial epistemological assumption may be seen to have lead realist 
philosophy onto a series of further opposing positions to those of empiricist theory and 
method, the same is also true with regards to the second of its key assumptions, that of 
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generative causation. While this notion is not entirely new, indeed it was the problems 
inherent within its inductive use that initially prompted empiricism's ineffectual adoption of 
the notion of contingent causation, realism has radically reconceived of this construct in an 
innovative and insightful way. 
Previously, the concept of productive, or generative cause was thought to refer to 
nothing more than the intimate relationship present between a cause and its effects, such 
that "If 'A' caused 'B"', then we could equally express this relationship as "If'B', then 
'A'". That is, cause and effect were thought to be directly related in what may be termed an 
"essentialist" fashion. Realism's departure from this traditional, and problematic, 
conceptualisation lies in that it states, in the case of the scenario presented above for 
example, that we may equally say, "If not 'B',then 'A"', for it wholly denies that a cause 
and its consequent effects are in any way directly, or necessarily, related. 
Within realist thinking, "cause" is considered to refer to an attribute, rather than to 
an event. To speak of cause is to refer to the mechanism that produced a particular effect, 
not the effect itself. Thus, cause and causation, refer to the structure of objects by which 
they hold particular causal attributes - sometimes referred to as "causal powers and 
liabilities"(Sayer,1984,p.94) - as opposed to their actualisation on any particular occasion. 
The rationale behind realism's denial of the existence of necessity in the relationship 
between cause and effect is, under these terms, easily explicable; for although an object 
may hold certain causal powers and liabilities necessarily, by virtue of its structure, 
whether or not such causal atttibutes will be elicited on any particular occasion, is a 
function of the contingent contextual environment in which it is placed. Thus, while wood 
necessarily possesses the causal power to float, by virtue of the relative density of its 
structure, whether or not it expresses this causal potential on any particular occasion is 
entirely dependent upon the the current contingent context in which it is placed - in this 
case, upon the presence of water. 
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These points may be more clearly illustrated by reference to the schematic 
portrayal of causation produced by Sayer(1984) and reproduced, in a slightly modified 
form, below in Figure 1. 
Object 
PART A 





X----------------(Pl, P2, P3 ) ................... 1 C2-----------E2 
I l__Ll, L2, L3) I C3-------------E3 
S \_ Cn-------------En 
= necessary relations 
= contingent relations 
Figure 1 The structure of causal explanation. 
Part A of the diagram represents an object, 'X', which is shown to have an 
underlying structure, 'S'. It is this structure that is in turn believed to necessarily give rise 
to the variety of causal powers and liabilities, 'Pl, P2, ... ", that (although only sometimes 
exhibited) the object always possesses. Part B, by contrast, represents the infinite number 
of contextual configurations, 'Cl-Cn', in which 'X' could be positioned at any given time, 
and then, the resultant, necessary effects, 'El-En', that would be incurred in each of these 
contexts. It is in the fact that Part A and Part B are only contingently related that crucially 
defines realism's unique perspective upon the causal process. The implications of this 
insight upon the methods and objectives it subsequently proposes are appropriate for 
"science" are manifold; particularly so in the case of the social sciences in which meaning, 
and the impact of the double hemeneutic, must also be considered. 
Realist Conception Of Science 
By focusing attention onto the object, rather than the event it contingently 
produces, realism is able to redefine the goal of "science" from that of predicting related 
effects in the world, to that of explaining how the structure of objects are capable of 
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producing the effects witnessed. Thus, by acknowledging the existence of a highly 
distinctive mix of both necessary and contingent relations within the structure of causation, 
realism significantly distinguishes between the predictive and explanatory goals of science. 
While prediction may be seen to be useful within certain contexts, realism, and 
realist scientific method, posit that our primary focus of attention should be directed upon 
the construction of non-predictive, causal explanations. Although predictive penetration 
has historically been considered the hallmark of adequate theory, realism's demonstration 
of the asymmetrical, non-equivalent nature of prediction and explanation redirects our 
theoretical emphasis toward the uncovering of the productive structures that an object 
necessarily possesses, and then, only subsequently, to a consideration of how such 
structures may be actualised within any particular context. 
Central to realist method, then, is the belief that abstract and empirical research 
represent two fundamentally different modes of inquiry, with different strategies being 
appropriate for each, and different aspects of "reality" being explained by each. Within the 
realm of abstract research, which aims to uncover, or. construct, pragmatically accurate 
portrayals of the generative structures within the world, "theory" assumes a greatly 
expanded and significant role from that of its previous empiricist conceptualization's. For 
whereas it was previously seen to be merely representative of the "ordering 
frameworks"(Lyons,1981,p.78) for our observations, or of quantitative redescriptions of 
predictable relationships; within the realist paradigm, theory comes to involve the rational 
positing of unobservable causal mechanisms, or existential hypotheses, which are believed 
to exist within the structure of the object under investigation. Such causal mechanisms are 
thought to be capable of explaining the causal potentials and liabilities that an object 
exhibits. This method of abstract theoretical construction primarily involves the use of 
grounded, retroductive inference. That is, it involves the process of inferring on the basis 
of other known structures, the existence of unobservable causal entities. Such postulated 
causal entities are then said to be "grounded" if we are able to adequately explain, even 
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metaphorically, how their proposed structure is capable of enabling the causal attributes that 
we have inscribed to it. 
We may, then, also note here the place of experimentation within the theory, or 
model building stages of conceptual understanding. By enabling the achievement of at least 
quasi-closure; that is the elimination of other interfering causal structures from the 
contingent context, experimentation enables the functioning of causal mechanisms to be 
more easily and unproblematically observed, and thus, facilitates the retroduction of their 
constituent structural nature. While the role of experiments within the realist research 
programme is radically altered from that of its employment within empiricism, its logic 
remains essentially the same. For the nature of the world determines that the methods of 
experimental control remain intelligible and sensible for both realism and empiricism. 
Once concepts of causal structures have been developed, via experimentation and 
retroduction, the methodological question that remains to be answered concerns how we 
may validly test such theoretical propositions. Clearly, predictive tests may be seen as 
inadequate; firstly because if the predicted event(s) fail to occur it could simply be due to 
the presence of an inappropriate context, and secondly, because if the predicted event does 
occur, then we cannot be certain that this result was due to our hypothesized causal 
structure and not some other, unknown, causal structure. Causal explanations, then, need 
to be subjected to explanatory test; that is, evaluation of the proposed structures and 
mechanisms of the object within Part 'A' of Figure 1, as opposed to their effects in Part 
'B'. As the properties under this heading are not necessarily unobservable, or otherwise 
inaccessible, this may be no more problematic than simply observing, under suitable 
conditions, if they operate in the manner proposed. Otherwise, structural analysis and 
appraisal may be necessary to assess the theory's validity. Note however, that our 
"internal access" through practice and socialisation to many of the structures and 
mechanisms, reasons and beliefs, of our own society are also valid forms of independent 
(intersubjective) evaluation of the proposed causal explanations. 
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While the concept of causal explanation and evaluation involves the analysis of the 
causal structure of the object, that is, of Part 'A' of Figure 1, realism is equally concerned 
with the subsequent realisation of this structure within the contingent contexts represented 
by Part 'B' of Figure 1. Thus, while realist theory invokes its strongest claims at the 
abstract level of hypothesized structures and mechanisms, such claims cannot be directly 
employed to explain instances of empirical behaviour at the level of concrete reality. 
Instead, this requires further empirical research into the exact nature of the context in which 
the object is operating. The practice of abstract causal explanation and of emphical causal 
explanation are thus very different. Applied, or empirical, research requires a more 
extensive range of knowledge at any point in time - that is, knowledge of the contingent 
context and the presence of countervailing and/or complimentary causal mechanisms 
contained therein - and is thus, founded upon methods of interpretation and synthesis, as 
opposed to those of abstraction, experimentation and retroduction. The implications of the 
existence of these two different modes of enquiry, suggested by the philosophy of realism, 
and the exact nature of the methodologies appropriate for each, will be considered more 
fully during the later examination of realism's potential role in the unsettled concrete realm 
of sport psychology. 
While realism offers significant, and even dramatic, advancements upon the 
conception of science offered by empiricist philosophy, in particular through its 
acknowledgement of the~ nature of scientific practice, and its consequent legitimation 
of various modes of "scientific" research, more recently, certain European inspired 
developments in the theory of knowledge have come to question some of realism's 
essentially structuralist foundations. Consequently, it is to an examination of the adequacy 
of such critiques, and an evaluation of the potential benefit that such alternative insights 
may offer our mode of inquiry, that I shall now turn. 
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Poststructuralism 
In recent years, philosophical discourse has continued to focus upon the question 
of the construction of knowledge and the creation of academic disciplines and methods. As 
we have already seen, empiricism and realism are two distinct visions of this highly 
contentious question. Following the translation of a variety of important European 
discussions concerning knowledge, there appears to be yet another sometimes compelling, 
if complex, voice contributing to this debate; that of poststructural theory. While, as I have 
suggested above, psychology and the wider realm of philosophical discourse seem, at 
present to be best se1ved by the tenets of realist theory, nonetheless, it would appear to be a 
futile and redundant opinion to posit that realism is the sole saviour of the discipline. 
Indeed, although poststructuralist thought does not, as I see it, offer a view which is 
wholly useful or even relevant to psychology, it is, I believe, important to recognise and 
explore the challenges that it may hope to offer this discussion. In this way, it would seem 
that realism, an essentially Anglo-American structure of ideas, might hope to continue to 
evolve and develop using, and perhaps exploring and discarding, the alternative views of 
European scholarship. As our discussion of empiricism suggests, philosophical inquiry 
cannot advance from within the strictures of a vacuum, and this is no less true for realism. 
It is for this reason that an exploration of poststructural theory seems pertinent, and 
particularly so considering that the wider psychological field, notorious for its lack of 
acknowledgement of any alternatives to empiricism, has totally failed to even hint at the 
existence of this new and often radical view of knowledge and discipline. 
As its name suggests, poststructuralism arose out of, and perhaps as a critique of 
the preceding theories of structuralism. In terms of chronology, these movements may be 
seen as beginning during the mid-1950s, when the writings of linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure came to the attention of European academics, and continuing into the present day. 
Obviously then, structuralism must be considered as the foundations upon which the 
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central tenets of poststructuralism, our central concern here, have been built. It is for this 
reason that a brief discussion of these founding notions seems necessary. 
Jean-Marie Benoist, in the title of a book on structuralism, describes it as a 
revolution - La Revolution Structural. and perhaps it is this aspect of the theory that is most 
interesting to us. The revolutionary aspect of structuralism is demonstrated, beyond the 
bare bones of discourse, in the fact that it evolved outside mainstream universities in 
marginal academic institutions, and that it reached its peak during the time of the French 
student rebellions of 1968. Primarily, however, structuralism's aims were not purely 
political. The revolutionary nature of this theory, it seems, is found in the idea that it can 
be adopted only as an alternative to the traditional tools of academic habits. Like realism, it 
cannot be picked out as a handy, extra methodological tool as the occasion suits, but rather, 
requires a change in traditional approaches to academic thought and research. But what 
must finally be considered as structuralism's most revolutionary aspect is the importance 
that it attributes to language: not only is language a major preoccupation of structuralist 
thinking, but language itself is used as a model for all manner of non-linguistic institutions. 
Saussure - The Importance Of Language 
Structuralism's and poststructuralism's pivotal interest in the ways in which 
language works are founded upon the theses posited by Swiss philologist and linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure, which in themselves constitute a radical departure from traditional 
assumptions regarding language. In essence, Saussure suggests that all activity - all social 
and cultural life - is governed by a system of signs which are either linguistic, or analogous 
to those of language. He proposes that languages are systems, constituted by signs that are 
arbitrary and differential. For Saussure, a sign is made up of the union of two elements, a 
sound-image or a written-image, and a concept; or a signifier and a signified. For example, 
the sound 'tree' that one hears or sees in speech or writing is the signifier, to which there 
corresponds a signified 'tree' in the sense of the concept which that sound or writing 
evokes in the mind of the auditor or reader. Using Saussure's suggestions that signs are 
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both arbitrary and differential, we see that firstly, the association of a signifier 'tree' with a 
signified 'tree' is fundamentally the product of linguistic convention, not a natural link, and 
secondly, that there is no natural or necessary relationship between the sign as a whole and 
the reality to which it may refer. 
Furthe1more, Saussure, by extension, is suggesting that there is an essential 
disjuncture between the world of reality and the world of language/signs. Words, under 
this view, articulate our experience of things, they do not simply express or reflect this 
experience. Indeed, it seems that words give form to what, without language would be a 
chaotic and undifferentiated jumble of ideas. 
French structuralist thought, applied as it has been to a wide range of disciplines, 
is founded upon Saussure's insight that all social and cultural behaviour has its basis in 
semiology - or the science of signs. The work of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, for 
example, uses Saussure's assumptions of the nature of human behaviour and, in doing so, 
goes some way to avoiding some of the positivist traps to which anthropology as a 
discipline seems dangerously open Rather than merely recording and reporting a plethora 
of observable facts and figures, Levi-Strauss, in Structural Anthropolo~y. approaches such 
diverse areas of inquiry as kinship systems or cooking as if they were systems structured in 
the same way as a language. This approach suggests that any elements which the observer 
may note, only have meaning in so far as they are part of a wider system. Under these 
terms, as Levi-Strauss demonstrates, it is the job of the anthropologist to map out this 
system and to define what may be described as the syntax or grammar of the various 
cultures or ethnic groups encountered. 
Again, as Saussure originally suggested, this method of observation and 
investigation is not the exclusive domain of such areas of inquiry as linguistics or 
anthropology, but rather is a means of approaching any number of diverse academic 
disciplines. Indeed, if culture is, as a later structuralist Roland Barthes says, " .. .in all its 
aspects ... a language ... "(Barthes,1972,p.15), then culture may be approached, above and 
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beyond the boundaries of traditional discourse, using the investigative tools that 
structuralism provides. This in itself may be a notion from which the discipline of 
psychology, at this point unreceptive to, and largely ignorant of the developments of 
structuralist thought, could perhaps benefit. 
The Production Of Meaning - A Critique Of Structuralism 
If, as French structuralism asserts, culture and social behaviour of all kinds are 
structured like a language, it would seem a pertinent question to ask how meaning and 
intersubjective understanding may be produced within this linguistically determined realm. 
And indeed, it is to this question that many of poststructuralism's exponents have 
addressed themselves. Most dominant of these theorists is French academic Jacques 
Deni.da who is one of the most influential participants in this arena of theoretical inquiry. 
Although Derrida's interests are clearly more far-reaching than those of the structuralist 
framework, it is important to note that Derrida still considers this framework as crucial to 
philosophical discussion. Indeed, as he writes in Wdtin& and Difference, we are still 
within the boundades of structuralism in so far as structuralism suggests "an adventure of 
vision, a conversion in the way of putting questions to any object."(Derrida,1978,p.3) 
If structuralism is an "adventure of vision", Denida, by contrast is quick to point 
out its blindspots. While, as Benoist suggested, structuralism began as a revolution with 
its twin assertions that everything is structured like a language, and that the world of words 
creates the world of things, Derrida says that as a methodological tool, it has been hijacked 
by the interests of conse1vatism and now seems to support the very concepts that Saussure 
had hoped to unde1mine. In pa1ticular, Derrida points out that structuralism continues to 
return us to instances of teleological thought, in which textural structures are uncovered by 
the insightful reader/researcher to reveal the hidden 'truth' or meaning of the text in 
question. Thus, under these terms, meaning is an already existing presence just waiting to 
be excarvated by the discerning inquirer. 
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For Deni.da, this approach not only undermines Saussme's original insight that 
the world of words and the world of things are essentially disjunct, but it also imposes a 
metaphysical element on structuralism which is clearly not viable in terms of the politics of 
such a disjuncture. More sinisterly, however,it sets in place a strategy of hierarchy. 
Certainly, as we see in the work of earlier structuralists, definite dualistic structmes were 
present in their thought which often went as far as to suggest that meaning is produced 
precisely through the logic of a binary system. Thus in the opposition masculine/feminine, 
for example, each term only receives its significance through its structural relationship to 
the other: 'masculine' would be meaningless without the direct and natural opposite 
'feminine' and vice versa. In this view, all meaning is produced in terms of an object's 
relationship to its binary opposite. Clearly, as Derrida often points out, binary logic cannot 
avoid the kinds of difficulties that Saussure had hoped to refute with his discussions of 
language systems. Binary logic not only establishes and maintains a situation whereby an 
element may be placed in a position of privilege over another, but also appears to suggest 
that, contrary to Saussure's argument, objects and concepts contain essential and 
determinable meanings which directly relate to their linguistic signs. 
For Deni.da, however, meaning is not produced in the static closure of binary 
oppositions, rather, it is achieved through what he calls the free play of signification. One 
way of illustrating Derrida's argument as this point is to look at Saussure's concept of the 
phoneme - defined as the smallest differential - and therefore signifying- unit in language. 
The phoneme can in no way be said to achieve signification through binary opposition 
alone. In itself the phoneme /b/ does not signify anything at all. If we had only one 
phoneme, there would be no meaning and no language. /b/ only signifies in so far as it is 
perceived to be different from say /k/ or /h/. Thus /bat/:/kat/:/hat/ are all perceived to be 
different words with different meanings in English. The argument is that /bl signifies only 
through a process that effectively defers its meaning on to other differential elements in 
language. In a sense, it is the other phonemes that enable us to determine the meaning of 
37 
/b/. For Derrida, signification is produced precisely through this kind of open-ended play 
between the presence of one signifier and the absence of others. 
This notion, then, is the basic significance of the De1ridean term differance. Spelt 
with an 'a' to distinguish it - in writing not in speech - from the normal French word for 
difference (difference), it acquires a sense of action with the -ance ending in French, and 
can therefore be translated both as 'difference' and 'deferral' in English. As Saussure's 
model showed us, the interplay between present and absent signifiers that produces 
meaning is posited as one of deferral: meaning is never truly present in any metaphysical or 
metatextural way, but is only constructed through the potentially endless process of inter-
reference to other absent signifiers. Thus a signifier can be said to give meaning to 
another, however, at no point can this process reach a point of teleological aporia. In 
Derridean terms, there is no "transcendental signified", where the process of deferral could 
finish. Such a transcendental signified would have to be meaningful in itself, fully present 
to itself, requiring no origin or end other than itself. An obvious example of a 
transcendental signified, in this sense, would be the Christian God- the alpha and omega, 
the originator and ender of the world. 
Like realist theory, Derrida's notion of differance challenges the assumptions of 
traditional scientific endeavour. Indeed, emphical science, as a cornerstone of western 
thought, has found itself one of the most obvious targets of Derrida's deconstructions. 
Denidean theory and poststructuralism at large, cdticises this kind of science for its 
constant claims to self-presence; for its espousal of objectivity and suggestions that, given 
the 'correct' procedures of research, traditional scientific inquiry can lead logically to a 
moment of enlightenment or truth. On the other hand, however, there is much in 
poststructural discourse that realism would wish to refute. For, while Derrida and others 
suggest that the external world is always deferred along an endless chain of signification, 
and thus cannot be said to exist in any 'real' way, realism, as we have seen, definitely 
posits the existence of an external, physical world. For realism, that distinction between a 
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reality which, although attainable only through language, exists independently of human 
behaviom, and poststructuralism's belief that the world of language constructs the world of 
things, is crucial. For if, as poststructural theory suggests, the existence of physical 
externalities is largely doubtful, then, in realist terms, poststructuralism seems to collapse 
towards a position of relativism and solipsism, the difficulties of which, for the purposes 
of science or research, are self-evident. 
Poststructuralism And Realism 
While this underlying disjuncture between the understandings of external reality 
and the production of meaning clearly place the projects of realism and poststructmalism 
essentially at odds, nonetheless, it is possible, I believe, to see some potential for the 
development and investigation of some of poststructuralism's notions within a realist 
framework, without the disturbance of any of realism's central tenets. For, just as we 
discussed above, while realism ultimately rejected the goals and assertions of empiricism, it 
was still able to retain a number of its methodological procedures, for example, those 
associated with experimental closure. In a similar fashion, some of poststructuralism's 
views of research or critical inquiry can perhaps be appropriated, again, without 
endangering the wider aims of realism. 
An example of this appropriative potential of the poststructural project seems to me 
to lie in its 'deconstructive' nature. As Denida and others suggest, western thought is 
largely based upon claims of metaphysical presence or authenticity constituted by a belief 
that some 'truth' or 'reality' has been pierced, presented and understood. A deconstructive 
approach to such claims would be to examine exactly upon what grounds truth or reality, 
even at the pragmatic level, is being postulated, and attempt to foreground the hierarchical 
operations within the discourse in question. As we have seen, this was Derrida's approach 
in his critique of binary thought, and it is an approach that has also been taken up by other 
theorists interested in the political implications of disturbing the constructions of hierarchy. 
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Similarly, this is an approach which may be of benefit to the theories of realism, 
particularly with regard to the problematic area of self-critique. A deconstructive 
examination of, for example, the realist project of model-building could perhaps reveal 
some ideologies at work within these models that, at the unconscious level, may be 
operating to construct or privilege positions of power; in short, to build hierarchies. 
Deconstruction, in this sense, may have strong implications for realism's approaches to the 
always problematic areas of race, gender and class. 
In the case of all the philosophical systems previously discussed, the enormous 
power of each to shape the direction of our research methods, topics and disciplinary 
structure as a whole, have been referred to only in the abstract. In order that the 
revolutionary nature of the impact that gross philosophical adjustments can have upon 
empirical practice may be more fully exposed - and also due to an inherent interest in the 
subject matter - what follows is an attempt to examine what effects, firstly, an ascription to 
empiricist philosophy has had upon the of realm of sport psychology, and subsequently, 




Psychology As A Product Of Philosophy: 
The Example Of Sport Psychology 
Overview: History as a Product of Philosophy 
Professional sport isn't about Physical sport anymore, its about coping with 
Pressure, and people are turning to Psychology to give them the edge. 
- i.D. Magazine, October 1990. 
The greatest challenge to have faced sport psychology over the course of the past 10 
to 15 years has been the need to confront and attempt to resolve the various problems that 
athletes in the field have increasingly presented to it. The astonishing growth of research 
and k_.nowledge in the areas of physiology, bio-mechanics and ergonomics over this same 
time span have so dramatically impacted upon sport as to have prompted many leading 
commentators to conclude that for the most part, professional athletes who share similar 
equipment, training schedules, diets, build-up and "peaking" procedures are, 
physiologically speaking, virtually inseparable. In terms of their fitness, strength and 
physical capacities, these athletes compare as being almost equivalent. Given these kinds 
of conclusions then, the burning question concerning people both within and outside the 
field of sport is exactly what is it that makes one athlete a winner and another a loser? It is 
this question that the multi-million dollar sports industry has taken to sp01t psychology in 
the hope of an answer. 
The response to date however, has proven to be of much greater importance to the 
structure of sport psychology as a discipline, than it has to the perf01mance of athletes on 
the field. While the various pressures exe1ted by the external demands of the wider sports 
community resulted, initially, in a flomish of activity and interest by sport psychologists 
into the resolution of those pragmatic concerns voiced by athletes, this rush of enthusiasm 
eventually gave way to increasing levels of internal conflict as the structures of the 
academic discipline proved incapable of effectively responding to the demands of the 
pressures being placed upon it. Unable to realise the kinds of successes that were being 
evidenced elsewhere, this conflict and frustration finally culminated in the single most 
dramatic development of the movement to date. This being the fracturing, or schism, of the 
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discipline into two distinct, and often acrimonious, schools of thought known respectively 
as academic sport psychology and applied sport psychology. 
Academic Sport Psychology - Empiricism Critiqued 
In general, the academic branch of sport psychology is associated with the use of 
orthodox scientific procedures as a means of achieving a valid and reliable understanding of 
the behaviour(s) in question. This may often take the f01m of an abstracted element of the 
behaviour being studied within an experimental setting. By contrast, the applied school of 
thought is characterised by a desire to focus upon the improvement of an athlete's 
pe1f ormance within the sporting context, and a willingness to employ any method or 
technique available to achieve this goal. In this sense, the emphasis of this branch of 
research has been less upon the achievement of scientific respectability and credibility, and 
more upon the attainment of practical success(es). 
Such an abandonment of the rules of orthodox science for reasons of practical 
efficacy however, have not sat well with the academic sports community. Indeed, for the 
most part they have reacted to the prodigious growth of the applied movement, from the 
time of its turbulent inception to the present, with open hostility. Repeatedly they have 
voiced their concerns as to the apparent lack of any coherent methodological structure, the 
wholesale appropriation of theories and therapies from mainstream psychology - which 
they perceive to be "blindly" implemented in the absence of any data to suggest their 
suitability - the lack of any systematic programme for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
therapies employed, and finally, the growth of a "non-scientific attitude that is [truly] 
frightening." (Landers, 1989,p.477) 
Although many salient criticisms exist in all of the areas listed above, it is 
unquestionably within the final issue, within the hazy realm of "unscientific-ness", that 
academic sport psychology finds itself most unified and vehement in its condemnation of 
the applied movement. Its primary concern for "service delivery" has revealed applied 
sport psychology to be a willing recipient of theories and methods that originate from a 
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wide variety of knowledge sources, including those "unlegitimated" spheres of knowledge 
that exist outside of the narrowly defined doctrines of orthodox science. For academic 
sport psychology, this willingness to move beyond the boundaries of legitimate science is 
seen as tantamount to opening the floodgates to that uncontrollable torrent of invalid, 
detrimental "psuedo-knowledge" that scientists have for so long sought to exclude from 
their arena. That is, to those areas of knowledge based upon introspective methods, 
experiential analysis and so-called "common-sense". 
Interestingly however, given the depth of feeling regarding this issue, nowhere 
does there exist within the academic sports literature any attempt at theoretically, or 
philosophically, demonstrating the exact ways in which such strategies are inferior to those 
of orthodox science. Unanimously authors have felt no compulsion to justify why their 
approach is superior to the alternatives they are condemning. Such blatant dogmatism 
effectively demonstrates the academic community's seemingly total, and unquestioning, 
indoctrination in the twin beliefs of orthodox science as sacrosanct, and the consequent 
existence of an inherent link between science and academic respectability. The existence of 
such dogma must then cast at least some initial doubt upon the validity of much of this past 
criticism. For under terms whereby any behavioural discipline found to be operating 
without the legitimating stamp of "science" automatically loses its claim to credibility, little 
can be expected in the way of constructive debate. Consequently the issue that academic 
sport psychology has long supposed closed, that is, the issue of whether the removal of 
orthodox scientific method from sport psychology necessarily threatens the legitimate 
progression of knowledge, or even more fundamentally, whether it destroys the discipline, 
in fact remains very much open. 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction of applied practitioners to this barrage of 
predominantly unsubstantiated rhetoric has been largely dismissive. Given the general 
absence of supportive analysis, they have been ostensibly "under-whelmed" by the earnest 
protestations of their academic detractors. Indeed, many have construed such criticisms as 
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a validation of the appropriateness of the alternative course they have chosen. For 
ironically, while the abandonment of orthodox rules and systems for attaining reliable 
knowledge remains a heretical and sacrilegious act for academics, it is widely viewed by 
adherents of the applied school as nothing less than emancipatory; as a liberation from the 
shackles imposed by the stringent doctrines of orthodox science. The doctrines which they 
claim bond academic sport psychology to the production of largely irrelevant and esoteric 
knowledge. 
Applied sport psychology, by no longer placing itself in a position of subservience 
to the needs of orthodox scientific method, perceives itself to be achieving at least two key 
"emancipatory" functions. Firstly, a non-orthodox stance is seen to effectively break the 
historically "exploitational" relationship that has traditionally existed between sport and 
mainstream psychology; a relationship in which the sports arena has served primarily as a 
testing ground for the furtherment of mainstream theories. This historical dynamic, it is 
claimed, has ultimately fostered a general disinterest in the real issues of sport in favour of 
the abstract concerns of general psychological theory. And secondly, and certainly most 
potently, it is considered to be the only effective means of providing the necessary freedom 
required to allow a concentrated attack upon the practical issues that are of most concern to 
sporting interests. 
The historical hierarchy outlined above, in which sp01t psychology has acted as the 
lesser element within the context of mainstream theory, when coupled with the apparently 
oblique, or at best highly abstracted, relevance of much academic (laboratory based) 
research to the real issues of the sporting community, may then be seen as representing the 
forces that initially drew applied sport psychologists "counter-criticism" of the academic 
community: this being that they are effectively slaves to their method. The accusation 
however is of more than mere historical relevance. Many contemporary investigations 
indicate that academic sport research continues to be driven more by a need to discover 
those abstract Questions that prove easily amenable to their orthodox methodology, than by 
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a desire to discover real answers to practical problems. Furthermore, it is widely noted 
within applied circles, that the "answers" academic researchers have thus far ventured, even 
to the "incidental" topics of investigation with which they have concerned themselves, have 
proven to be of little relevance to the world beyond the four walls of the laboratory from 
whence they came. The 
unique, controlled, and artificial environments [ used] to observe people .... in tum 
produce artificial, contrived behaviour unique to the environment ... created. 
(Martens,1987,p.31) 
That is, criticism now is roundly levelled at the long-standing inability of orthodox 
scientific method to achieve high degrees of external validity within open system (social) 
contexts. 
Thus, while dissatisfaction with academic sport psychology has stemmed, initially 
at least, from a heightened sense of practical frustration with its predominant concerns for 
mainstream psychological theory, methodological "c01Tectness" and an inability to achieve 
pragmatically relevant results, increasingly this frustration has resulted in a more 
fundamental questioning of the philosophical underpinning's upon which such orthodox 
approaches are based; that is, of the sacrosanct scdptures of neopositivist social science. 
Among the most articulate of those making such criticisms in this area is the 
outspoken sport psychologist Rainer Martens. Since the late '70's he has continued to 
question the appropriateness of many of orthodox science's most central tenets to the study 
of human sports behaviour. At the heart of Martens' criticisms have been his examinations 
of firstly, the orthodox touchstone of objectivism, or more broadly, the dualistic 
epistemology that it commonly espouses. And secondly, the ontological commitment to the 
theory of reductionism that is evidenced throughout most academic research. Not only are 
these factors seen to diminish the practical relevance of much academic study, but further, 
Martens contends, they actually represent wholly inadequate philosophical understandings 
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of the nature of the social world and of the type of methodology that is appropriate for 
further uncovering this nature. 
Primarily through the work of Michael Polanyi, whose generally Realist discourses 
are broadly similar to those outlined earlier, Martens has demonstrated the fallacy of the 
notion of objectivism by pointing to the e1Toneous assumptions of "pre-interpreted givens", 
or the "sensate" as separable and independently meaningful from "perception", upon which 
this notion is based. Similarly, he disputes the commonly associated "true - false", 
"significant - insignificant" dualisms that permeate empiricist philosophy. Noting that as 
our knowledge may never fully escape the supposedly self-serving vagaries of human 
cognition, in order to "roam free" upon the legitimating soil of objectivism, it follows that 
we are in fact, never in a position to truly know whether our perceptions of the external 
world actually correspond to its reality. In this sense, our knowledge of the world can 
never be fully validated, or conversely, falsified. Thus, the absolutist notions posited 
within objectivist reasoning cannot be legitimately maintained. Instead, Martens proposes 
that human inter-subjective knowledge must be seen to exist upon a continuum of 
reliability: 
.. knowledge is more or less reliable, but .. .it is still knowledge as long as its 
probability of being c01Tect is greater than chance.(Martens,1987,p.45) 
The intention here is, of course, not to merely show the weaknesses of the 
empiricist philosophical tradition, but to also demonstrate the ways in which the unjustified 
privileging of such concepts has directly limited the potential effectiveness of much 
academic research. Clearly, academia's persistent employment of assessment procedures 
that aim to preclude the use, or deny the validity, of all knowledge that is found to be 
"statistically insignificant" or "subjective" is a prime example of this limitation. By 
regarding such arbitrary, and philosophically dubious, criteria as the sole means of 
legitimate evaluation, academic sp01t psychology robs itself of many of its richest and most 
vital knowledge sources. The continued denigration of experiential knowledge, as both a 
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valid medium for systematic research and criterion for research evaluation, upon such 
clearly unsustainable grounds, leaves orthodox methodology hamstrung, unable to 
effectively venture beyond the sterile and controlled environment of the experimental 
laboratory. 
Contributing equally to the creation of such "isolationism" is, as Martens' second 
major criticism of orthodox science suggests, its commitment to reductionism as the most 
appropriate means of understanding the world, or more specifically, the psychology of 
sport. The goal of such a strategy is, ultimately, to achieve an explanation of the complex 
intricacies of human (sports) behaviour in terms of the lawful interaction of sub-atomic 
particles. Unlike many strange sounding scientific ideals, however, this one i£, I believe, 
as implausible as it initially sounds. 
The main assumption behind the strategy of reductionism is that an object is fully 
explicable in terms of the combined knowledge of its constituent parts. Unfortunately 
however, elemental disaggregation seldom yields a full comprehension of the powers and 
attributes an object displays. Indeed, an exhaustive study of the volatile substances of 
hydrogen and oxygen would hardly suggest that in a certain combination the two would 
emerge with the ability to extin~uish fire! Such simple additive, or linear, conceptions of 
the world's structure blatantly ignore the fact that its obviously stratified and interactive 
nature is inherently irreducible. Thus, if we wish to examine the potentials of water, while 
a knowledge of its constituent parts is obviously useful, ultimately our main focus of study 
must be upon water. To direct our attention elsewhere is to risk failing to capture the 
essence of the object we are attempting to understand. In short then, an object must be 
understood "at its own level."(my emphasis; Sayer,1984,p.lll) 
Applied Sport Psychology: The Loss Of Theory 
Ignorance of this maxim and the consequent diversion of much academic research 
energy away from the study and explanation of the full dynamics of sports behaviour, to an 
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obsession with the discovery and prediction of those "regular relationships" which may be 
found to exist between its more "basic constituents", is what Martens considers to be the 
most "practical" danger of the reductionist philosophy currently operating. To illustrate the 
power of this near obsession, Martens points to the continued compulsion of academic 
researchers investigating the relationships between sports anxiety and performance, to seek 
out "positive con-elations" between, supposedly, fundamental physiological variables, and 
consequent self-report/performance variables, despite the existence of "considerable 
evidence to suggest that physiological variables are [in fact] poor predictors of anxiety 
states."(Martens,1987,p.44) Although many researchers readily acknowledge the 
limitations, if not the en-or, of such reductionist strategies - which commonly assume the 
existence of unproblematic, non-interactive, additive relationships between the assorted 
variables under consideration - most persist with their employment because it is all they 
know. As Maslow (1966) obse1ved, "It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, 
to treat everything as if it were a nail."(pp.15-16) 
This ignorance of valid alternatives, however, is not the exclusive domain of the 
academic community. For while the pragmatic complaints and philosophical critiques of 
applied sport psychologists have served to debunk much of the widely propagated 
mythology associated with the common perception of 01thodox method as a "super-human" 
power; that is, a power embued with the ability to transcend the "illusions" and frailties of 
human consciousness in order to establish the definitive version of "truth, justice,and the 
sporting way", such critiques have not provided a legitimating foundation for much of the 
research methodology that applied practitioners have enacted in its place. That is, rejection 
of this opposing view has not fully validated their own position. Indeed, there remain 
several major problem areas inherent within the broad range of approaches that are 
commonly utilised by applied sport psychology. 
Of most fundamental concern is undoubtedly the growth of a manifestly non-
evaluative and non-analytical stance amongst the applied research community. The origins 
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of this maladaptive attitude may, I believe, be isolated to two largely unrelated aspects of 
the applied school's recent historical development. The first of these involves the 
widespread miscomprehension, by applied practitioners, of the implications that may be 
validly drawn from the earlier critiques made of orthodox method. For the consequent 
rejection of this method has been (falsely) interpreted by many as sanctioning the adoption 
of a more generally "non-methodological" and "non-systematic" approach in its place. The 
introduction of alternative methodologies being largely ignored. 
Compounding this situation has been the action of the second contributing factor, 
which involves the "motivating dynamics" of the applied discipline itself. As applied 
research is driven almost exclusively by "financial" considerations - that is, by attempts to 
meet the needs, or resolve the problems, presented to it by athletes and other clients in 
return for payment - there has developed a conesponding disinterest in the more strictly 
defined "research", or "theoretical", considerations that typically command systematic 
investigation and evaluation. Together these two forces have produced the situation in 
which the only validation a theory, or therapy, requires in order to demonstrate some 
"legitimate" effectiveness, for applied practitioners, is that it "appears" to work. For 
clearly, if all evaluative method is considered to be ultimately flawed and arbitrary in 
nature, and financial/client demands are able to be fully satisfied by the appearance of some 
positive effect, then the seductive power of such a simplistic criteria becomes readily 
apparent. 
Beyond such immediate evaluative limitations, however, this methodologically 
lackadaisical attitude underlies a concurrent development, within the applied discipline, of a 
more general circumscription in the relationship existing between itself and theory. This 
nanowing of concern being most clearly evident with regard to their involvement, firstly, 
with theory construction and, secondly, in their increasingly attenuated conception of what 
adequate theory actually is. 
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Dealing with the first issue of theory construction, while it is clear that this activity 
was never considered to be the prime objective of applied research, there remained a widely 
held belief, amongst applied practitioners, that the freedoms achieved through their 
dismissal of orthodox method to attack the practical issues that are of most concern to sport 
would somehow naturally "flow on" towards the construction of their own pragmatically 
generated theoretical understandings and conceptualization's of sporting behaviour. To 
date however, this has not proven to be the case. Rather, lacking the provision of any 
systematic alternative methodology(s) by which theoretical understandings, and/or 
therapeutic techniques, may be adequately evaluated, built, or further developed, the 
applied discipline has instead been left only with the chronic inability to achieve significant 
theoretical growth, which has in turn continued its dependence upon theoretical 
formulations derived extensively from outside the field of sport - most prominently from 
mainstream psychology. 
Thus, far from breaking the much maligned dysfunctional and exploitational 
relationship that has historically plagued the interactions between mainstream and sport 
psychology, the applied school has, in a twist of bitter-sweet irony, merely reversed it. 
For rather than sport continuing to serve as the unrewarded workhorse of mainstream 
interests, it is now mainstream theory that finds itself involved in a non-reciprocating, one-
way flow of information from itself to the applied discipline. In essence then, while the 
direction and development of "academic" theory has been constrained by an overly 
inflexible methodology, the development of "applied" theory has, by contrast, been 
restricted by its apparent laQk of a coherent methodological structure! 
Contributing further to this restriction of theoretical development is the less 
tangible, though potentially more far-reaching, limitation of applied sport psychology's 
currently atrophied conception of "theory" itself. For where theory has previously been 
conceived of as the means by which we come to understand and explain behaviour (even 
though the conceptualisation of ·"explanation" has historically proven to be inadequate 
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within academic circles), within applied sport psychology, it is this explanatory objective 
itself that has been largely eliminated. In its place has come the call for "theory" that aims 
purely and simply at predictin~ the likely outcome of future sporting performances. 
The (financial) pressures exerted upon applied spmt psychologists to enable ove1t 
improvements in athletic performance, along with their more general evaluative impotence, 
has thus translated into the creation of a greatly narrowed conception of theory in which its 
defining characteristic has essentially become the ability to manipulate future instances of 
empirical behaviour through the use of generalised descriptions and predictive rules - even 
where the causal operation of such rules are themselves not fully understood. Thus, for 
example, the "Inverted U" description of sport anxieties relationship to consequent 
performance is, under these terms, considered to be adequate theory for it allows the 
establishment of a predictive relationship between an athlete's anxiety level and the 
likelihood of future optimal performance - even though the causal mechanisms that underlie 
this process may remain a mystery. Indeed, Martens himself has stated that a knowledge 
of causal structures and generative mechanisms is largely unnecessary for 
we can readily enough develop programs for helping athletes manage their anxiety 
without fully knowing the causes of anxiety.(Martens,1987,p.53) 
Again, then, another clear irony is found to exist. For while Martens critiques 
academic reductionism for this exact tendency, that is, the tendency to seek out simplistic, 
descriptive "regular relationships" between supposedly "fundamental" variables, he, and 
the applied school more generally, apparently advocate the promotion of just such 
descriptive analysis as the foundation of adequate theory, merely provided that it is free of 
any similar reductionist regresses in its own structure. While the appeal of such 
instrumentalist, or predictive, approaches is readily apparent, and indeed can easily seduce 
the uncritical thinker into the somewhat cavalier attitude of never mind how it works as 
long as it works, as a conception of theory, it is unfortunately, wholly inadequate. For if 
theory is to tell us anything at all, it must tell us how things work. 
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The applied school's confused belief that we may easily alleviate the psychological 
problems of sport (for example, anxiety) without achieving some understanding of their 
"causes", is then, mistaken. For what it consistently fails to appreciate is that the very 
"remedies" it ultimately promotes are, in fact, initially based extensively upon our 
theoretical knowledge of the underlying causal structures of such psychological inhibitants, 
and only subsequently upon the kinds of generalised, descriptive knowledge, that applied 
practitioners wish solely to employ. Thus, in the case of sports anxiety, most programmes 
are typically based initially upon our causal knowledge of the dynamic impact of the 
underlying determinants of anxious sporting behaviour(s), be they cognitive - such as the 
effect of differing appraisals, apprehensions or objectives - or physiological - such as the 
mechanisms that redirect blood flow from our extremities to our larger muscle groups. It is 
only subsequently, when we discover the empirical situation of particular athletes, that the 
generalised descriptions promoted by applied practitioners - such as high anxiety's 
common association with low pe1formance - may be more fully employed in order to 
determine what level of anxiety is most desirable in each individual case. If, however, we 
were provided solely with this latter, descriptive, knowledge we could in fact do very little 
to help the anxious athlete. For in the absence of any further information as to .hmY, the 
relationship works, we are essentially left unable to chan&e it. Put more simply, if we do 
not know how something works, be it human or machine, should it break down, we are 
seldom in a position to adequately "fix" it. 
The existence of such inherent problems and weaknesses within both academic and 
applied sport psychology, thus indicates that beyond their immediate inability to meet the 
psychological challenges presented by the sporting context, neither school is even 
potentially capable of, single-handedly, meeting such challenges. While the academic 
fratemity have suggested innumerable "improved strategies" that it believes may eventually 
enable it to overcome its current limitations - such as, greater reductionism for more 
"fundamental" understandings(Morgan,1989), more "imaginative" experiments to 
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overcome the seeming artificiality of its data/results(Landers,1989), better "measurement 
technologies" for greater accuracy(Roberts,1989), and so on - such obsequious calls for 
stricter applications of the same orthodox method are ultimately destined to fail. For it is 
not simply "unimaginative" experimenters that limit what we can leam from experiments, 
but rather, what expedments themselves are capable of telling us. In short then, the 
limitations exist within the method, not within those using it. 
Equally, although the applied school has increasingly acknowledged the many 
short-comings involved in its present approach, it similarly believes that these may be 
(easily) resolved by modifying certain aspects of its current direction. Again, however, it 
too fails to comprehend where the ultimate source of its limitations lie; this being not so 
much in its focus solely at the level of empirical instances of sports behaviour, as is often 
claimed, but rather in what it is reasonable for us to expect to leam from such a focus. For 
while it clearly enables a multitude of valuable insights into the actual operation of many of 
the fundamental, or generative, structures of sport psychology within different contexts, 
alone it cannot fully enlighten us as to the actual nature of such structures. Thus, while the 
calls for improvements such as more problem-oriented, evaluative research using 
alternative methodologies(Martens,1987; Feltz,1987), are undoubtedly useful, they still 
cannot provide the applied discipline with the "whole answer" to the vaded questions of 
sport. 
The Realist Interpretation 
It is at this problematic juncture that the altemative theory of Realist philosophy can, 
I believe, no longer be denied. For its radical reinterpretation of the nature of human 
knowledge, causality and the ontological structure of the world, provides it with both a 
unique and coherent insight into the appropriate role(s) of different "sciences", and thus, 
into the potential resolution of those outstanding issues that presently continue to confront 
both sport psychologies. Indeed, perhaps the most immediate achievement of Realism's 
broader epistemic framework, lies in its clear reconceptualization of the two sub-disciplines 
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various methodological "weaknesses", as being more accurately construed of as merely 
representations of the ina12propriate application of method, rather than of inherently flawed, 
or universally redundant methodologies. Thus, at a fundamental level, it asserts that we 
must always critically assess whether our method is appropriate, or capable of achieving, 
the knowledge goals and objectives we have set for it. fu this way, through its integrated 
world view and systematic programme of analysis, it represents a vital and commanding 
alternative to the (neo )positivist systems and constructions that traditionally have 
determined the polarisation of competing views and positions into the disharmonious 
dichotomies that are widely evidenced today. 
That neopositivism lies behind the unjustifiably extreme attitudes of mutual 
exclusion that currently exist within sport psychology, with regards to the methods and 
procedures of the two competing factions, is a largely unrecognised, but highly significant 
case in point. For what is seldom acknowledged in this area is that both schools presently 
continue to ascribe to many of positivism's fundamental tenets; that is, both continue to 
ascribe to the belief that the understandings, or knowledge, they generate through their 
research must necessarily be structured within positivism's world view of contin&ently 
related phenomena and predictive "explanations". Once the presence of this common 
ascription is acknowledged however, what becomes clear is that much of the 
methodological competition we currently witness stems not from the desire to achieve 
different understandings of sport psychology - as is commonly assumed - but from the 
desire to achieve very similar understandings (that is,neopositivist) through the use of 
substantively different methods. The two methodologies thus have not been attempting to 
answer uniquely structured questions peculiar to their own particular spheres of inquiry, 
but have, instead, been attempting to resolve a common set problems (if not research 
topics) in a highly competitive fashion. The opportunity for complimentary. 
methodological co-existence within this environment has unsurprisingly proven to be 
virtually impossible. 
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At first glance the plausibility of the above assertions would appear to many to be 
slight. For while few would doubt the empiricist character of academic sport psychology, 
it is equally the case that just as few would readily recognise such traditions as existing 
within the applied branch of the discipline. However, that such traditions do exist within 
applied sport psychology is undeniable. Indeed even amongst its most progressive 
proponents, such as Martens(1987) and Feltz(1987,1989), empiricist notions of Humean 
causation and lawfulness [for example," .. knowledge .. .is still knowledge as long as its 
probability of being correct is greater than chance."(my emphasis, Martens(l987),p.45)] 
and hypothetico-deductive (H-D) (predictive) theoretical systems are clearly retained, and 
conceived of as representing the fundamental structures upon which any adequate 
understanding of sporting behaviour must be built - even those constructed through the use 
of the alternative methods they propose. This then serves to explain why although applied 
sport psychology has been vocal in its criticism of much of the academic disciplines 
methodology (that is, experimental over tacit understandings) and research topics (for 
example, its preference for "abstract questions" over "practical problems"), it has not 
generally extended its criticisms to the more fundamental structure of the understandings 
that such research attempts to construct (that is, its preference for predictive over 
explanatory understandings). Debate has concentrated less upon the fundamental 
objectives of research than it has upon the best route, or method, by which such 
understandings may be effectively achieved. Clearly, as long as each school continues to 
believe that the redundancy of the other lies essentially in its method - be it experimentally 
or tacitly founded - rather than in its essentially positivist perception of the nature of 
"reality" (and consequent purpose of its research) then little progress can be expected 
towards the potential reconciliation and co-operation of the two sub-disciplines. 
What is required then, in the first instance at least, is a rejection of this pervasive 
and inadequate, "empiricist ethos" that historically has proven to be the creator and 
maintainer of disunity and fragmentation within sp01t psychology, and the adoption in its 
56 
place of an alternative system capable of combating such rampant factionalism. It is most 
significantly Realism's disparate conception of causation that situates it so ideally for 
assuming this essentially unifying role. 
Realist Science: Reevaluation and Synthesis 
Discovering the cause(s) of an event within neopositivist thinking has typically 
involved the search for "constant conjunctions" between what are assumed to be 
contin~ently related variables. While the discovery of such constant conjunctions -
typically identified via the presence of high c01Telations - is not considered to be a sufficient 
condition to automatically infer the existence of a causal relationship, it has almost 
unanimously been thought to at least represent a necessary one. The effect of this 
contingently founded causal epistemology has been to produce not only the widely 
assumed (though mistaken) symmetry between prediction and explanation, but also to 
direct academic and applied research towards the same ends of simply attempting to 
uncover such constant conjunctions. For as events are thought to simply consist of 
sequentially and contingently related variables, the search for what may be termed "real 
causes" has been rendered essentially meaningless; the only viable search left is that for 
stabilised patterns, or generalisable narrative descriptions, of behaviour. Thus, we find 
within the applied discipline that interest is focused primarily upon uncovering those 
generalised patterns of sporting behaviour that are derivable from linking together 
qualitative aspects of the sporting context via the coaches and athletes own tacit 
understandings of what elements and variables together combine so as to most often 
produce a positive sporting outcome. Equally, within academic sport psychology this 
contingent causal epistemology is expressed through the experimentally based strategies 
that aim to uncover highly correlated variables within the laboratory in order that they may 
then be unproblematically used to directly explain similar relationships within the world of 
actual events. 
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As noted earlier, the structure of the research question thus remains the same for 
both schools, for both aim to discover the same stable, predictable and contingently based 
patterns of sporting behaviour that they believe will "explain" the psychology of sport -
though they approach the problem from opposite ends of the spectrum. The mechanisms 
that underlie or produce such patterns (and the other various outcomes evidenced), how 
they work and what properties they possess are, under these terms, granted only a 
secondary and hypothetical status. As "real" causes are not thought to exist, the 
consideration of causal structure is consequentially seen to merely represent a search for 
potentially useful "conceptual tools" that may facilitate our understanding by way of 
providing helpful analogies; it is ce1tainly J.1Q.t considered to be our central focus of concern. 
Realism, by contrast, contends that causes are more than merely overt regularities, 
but rather that objects have various causal powers and liabilities by virtue of their nature. 
This notion of generative cause (Harre & Madden, 197 5) states that objects actually 
produce changes as a consequence of the mechanisms they possess. Thus, metals, for 
example, have the causal power to conduct electricity n.Q1 because the conduction of 
electricity is always associated with the presence of an electric current, but rather because 
metals possess the structure/mechanism of free ions. Note here that even in the absence of 
an electric cunent, metals still retain this causal power. It exists independently of it now or 
ever being actually realised. Because of this, an object (or causal mechanism) cannot be 
directly linked to the effects that it may produce, for such effects are determined in the 
contin~ent conditions in which the object is placed. 
It is this central insight, the disassociation of an object's causal powers and 
liabilities from being directly related to its consequent effects- as these depend upon the 
multitude of contingent contexts in which it may be operating- that most radically 
transforms the objectives and roles that Realist philosophy proposes are most appropriate 
for the academic and applied branches of sport psychology. 
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Academic sport psychology's employment of empiricist experimental method has 
traditionally viewed the goal of such laboratory based research to be that of uncovering the 
patterns, rules, or generalized (H-D) "laws" of behaviour by which we may then directly 
predict/"explain" the behaviour of specific individuals outside of the laboratory. By the 
above Realist analysis, however, this goal is patently inappropriate for at least two major 
reasons. Firstly, because if the particular causal powers and liabilities that an object will 
realise on any particular occasion depend entirely upon the enabling or inhibiting conditions 
of the context in which it is placed, then its operation within the controlled environment of 
the closed system laboratory is highly unlikely to be matched by its operation within the 
complex open system of the world of sport. Thus, it becomes clear why academic sport 
psychology's past and present attempts at extrapolating its laboratory/experimental findings 
directly onto real sporting contexts have proven to be fraught with difficulties, and 
ultimately unsuccessful. It is because the two contexts elicit very different causal responses 
from the individuals involved. 
The second reason for the traditional employment of experimental method to be 
considered inappropriate, from a Realist point of view, is because its focus upon simply 
predicting behaviour ignores the more important task of seeking to uncover the nature and 
structure of the generative causal mechanisms that underlie the behavioural patterns 
observed. Given that objects possess an independent causal structure that will always be 
underdetermined by its effects- that is, the limited number of contexts in which we can 
observe the object will not reflect its total causal capacities- the role of experiments is 
clearly not to simply catalogue the various patterns of responses observed in the different 
experimental contexts in which we can place the object. Rather, the appropriate goal of 
experimental analysis, with regards to the patterns it may uncover, lies in their employment 
as tentative clues as to the possible nature and structure of the causal mechanisms 
implicated. The aim then is to create theoretical understandings, or models, of the 
underlying causal mechanisms involved. Objects, then, behave necessarily due to their 
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causal structures within different contexts. If we can uncover these structures, via 
experimentation, we are better able to evaluate hmY. the object may consequently behave 
within any particular contingent context. The actual explanation of concrete behaviour is 
thus not the concern of experimental, academic sport psychology, for such explanations 
require the additional knowledge of context - material and socio-cultural - that academic 
sport psychology does not possess. Rather, this explanatory role is thought to be the 
proper function of the applied sciences, and in this case, of applied sport psychology. 
The role of the applied sciences and their relationship to their academic, 
experimentally based counterparts may be more easily understood by reference to the 
physical science example of Meteorology presented by Secord and Manicas(l983). In 
Meteorology we find an example of a discipline that applies causal knowledge of 
mechanisms and structures in the physical world that have been derived from the work of 
the experimental sciences; such as physics, chemistry, geology, and astronomy, to specific 
contingent contextual situations, in which knowledge of the local terrain, time of year, 
amount of industrial pollutants and so forth are provided, in order to explain and predict 
concrete instances of weather. Consequently, Meteorology is not considered to be an 
"exact" science, and we are clearly much better able to causally explain previous weather 
patterns than we are able to predict those which may appear in the future. For while our 
knowledge of the causal stmctures involved is often incomplete, or even simply incorrect, 
we are more often entirely unable to know the exact configuration over the contingent 
context in which such structures will be operating. An unforeseen volcanic emption of 
tonnes of ash and debris, for example, could wreck havoc upon a forecast of clear skies 
and sunny weather! 
The implications of this style of analysis for the stmctures and objectives of all 
social science, and of sport psychology in particular, are profound. The previously cited 
criticisms of experimentally based academic sport psychology as being a discipline 
removed from the "real" issues confronting athletes, of embarking upon experimental 
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studies that lack any significant degree of external validity, for example, may now be 
reinterpreted within the light of the greatly circumscribed role now prescribed for 
experimental analysis. By seeking to uncover causal mechanisms rather than simply 
reflecting the overt behaviours witnessed outside the laboratory, high external validity is 
now no longer dependent upon the degree of similarity existing between the object's 
behaviour inside and outside of the laboratory. The relationship between internal and 
external validity is thus not one which is antagonistic, or inversely related as is so 
commonly supposed. Indeed, as long as the object under investigation retains its identity 
across the experimental situation, then the fact that it may act differently across 
experimental and open system contexts should not be surp1ising- indeed, quite the opposite 
in fact! For as Greenwood(l 982) states, 
experimental method is not invalid because persons behave differently in the 
laboratory than they do in the real world, anymore than the experimental method is 
suspect in natural science because mechanisms behave differently in closed and 
open systems.(p.232) 
High internal validity that allows us to subsequently retroduce the structure of the causal 
mechanisms involved is then directly related to the adequacy of our external validity, that 
is, our explanation of their operation within complex open systems. 
Equally, applied sport psychology's much criticised strategy of appropriating 
theory from its academic counterparts, and of using tacit, contextually based information to 
formulate remedial, or pe1f ormance enhancing, programmes for athletes, may no longer be 
conceived of as necessarily representing entirely inappropriate, "unscientific", or regressive 
approaches any more than such theoretical borrowing and contextually specific information 
is inappropriate to, for example, meteorological investigations. 
Thus, Realism's alternative to the traditional Humean conception of cause allows us 
to redefine the directions, objectives, and aspirations of the two schools of sport 
psychology in such a way as to pe1mit the particular strengths and weaknesses of each to 
compliment one another in a co-operative and productive fashion. While the change in 
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emphasis required by each school is significant, it should be noted that many of the 
"infrastructural" requirements; that is, experimental method, qualitative understandings, 
and so forth, are already in place. 
The Problem Of Consciousness 
Having said this, however, it must be conceded at this point that there remains 
several contentious areas of concern that must be dealt with before the academic-applied 
research structure outlined above can be unproblematically taken up within the realm of 
human sports behaviour. For, as many would be quick to point out, although this system 
would appear to work well within the physical sciences world of inanimate objects, 
significant obstacles remain to its easy application to the social sciences. 
Most significant amongst these is the apparent antagonism that exists between the 
realist notion of structural natural necessity and the existence of human agency and free 
will. For realism's contention that an object will necessarily realise certain causal powers 
and liabilities when placed within a specific environment due to its independent causal 
structure appears a difficult concept to extend from the physical to the social world. That 
metals will always necessarily conduct electricity in the presence of an electric current by 
virtue of their independent causal structure is easily comprehendable; that humans behave 
similarly is not. For even within a closed system "it typically seems that the person could 
have done otherwise than the actual act performed." (Secord, 1990,p.80) The fact that 
people can choose to act differently when placed in identical situations would appear then to 
jeopardize the legitimacy of realism's causal-explanatory approach with regards to the 
human sciences. 
From an acceptance of this point, the acceptance of the existence of human freewill, 
many have argued that attempts to causally explain human behaviour by reference to the 
necessary action of generative mechanisms and structures is in fact impossible. Instead, 
they contend that human consciousness demands that the proper goal of scholarship 
becomes one of seeking to understand an actor's own motivations and/or understandings of 
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a situation, and therefore to clarify the meanings of the participants actions. Thus, they 
argue in the manner of Wittgenstein(1922) and Winch(1958), that because human action is 
largely intentional it cannot be properly understood without fully knowing the actors own 
intentions; for example, does a two fingered gesture represent an obscene sign or simply 
the traditional 'V' for victory? This hermeneutical perspective thus contends that the 
overriding task of social scholarship lies in the interpretive analysis of meaning, of the 
semiotics of human action. 
Because human action, so conceived, is based within the continually changing 
world of constitutive meaning, all actions are perceived to be so individuated and 
particularised that to talk of "cause" becomes inapprop1iate or redundant. Actions cannot 
be explained by causes, but merely described by references to meaning. Within 
psychology the expression of this view is most closely associated with Gergen's 
(1985,1986) social constructionist position. This states that human action is a socially 
constructed product of the meanings we assign to our behaviour and that consequently it is 
only by examining such constructions that we can ever come to understand the behaviours 
observed. 
Unsurprisingly, the relativist themes of such hermeneutically based approaches 
have been vehemently rejected by all parties interested in representing a "scientific" 
approach to the study of human behaviour, but as Greenwood(1982) has noted, in the rush 
to reject such he1meneutical accounts 
tout court, a number of very important babies ... [have been] thrown out with the 
bath water.(p.226) 
For while such accounts clearly cannot be reconciled with the traditional view of causation, 
based as it is upon the existence of invariant relations between variables, 
Greenwood(l982,1989) and others have argued that many of the central insights of the 
hermeneutic approach may be unproblematically retained within the realist position without 
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threatening its notions of natural necessity or the potential of causally explaining human 
behaviour. 
The basis of this realist belief lies simply in the fact that reasons, beliefs and choices 
may themselves be granted causal status; they may be seen to be as much essential features, 
or structures, of "humanness" as the property of free ions is of "metalness". As such they 
are not thought to be able to directly explain instances of behaviour at the concrete level of 
actual events, as is supposed by exclusively hermeneutical accounts, but rather are thought 
to have generative structures and enabling and inhibiting (social) conditions that are 
themselves potentially knowable. Thus, while peoples ability to behave differently in 
similar situations as a result of the different choices they make does make causal 
explanations extremely difficult, it does not make them impossible. Manicas(l 986) has 
argued from this position that experimental science may then be able to examine the 
generative structures all humans share at the cognitive level that allow the faculties of 
rational decision making and free choice to occur, while sociological, anthropological, and 
hermeneutical approaches may equally be employed to show how such causal structures 
interplay with the open ended rules of social institutions that regulate our everyday 
behaviours and by which our actions are understandable. Thus, the central insight of the 
hermeneutical approach is maintained but placed within the broader framework of a greater 
explanatory picture. A picture which includes causal mechanisms (discovered in the 
experimental laboratory), individual history and self perceptions, plus implicated socio-
cultural structures. 
The acknowledgement of the relevance of this hermeneutical element to social 
research may then be seen as having its greatest significance to realism's research 
programme in that its focus upon meanin&: clearly demonstrates the relational nature of 
social phenomena and thus of the inherently interdisciplina,y status of attempts to explain 
such phenomena. That social behaviours are relational in nature; that is, they are 
understood by the actor and others in terms of their relationship to various aspects of the 
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context in which they occur, is particularly significant in terms of the changes it suggests 
are required in the style and structure of the human experimental situation currently 
employed. 
The goal of experiments conducted within a realist framework is to allow an 
"epistemologically privileged observational situation" (Greenwood, 1982, p.228) in which 
interfering, extraneous mechanisms may be eliminated in order that the operation of the 
causal mechanisms implicated may be more clearly observed. This approach may be useful 
in both the theory building stage of research, whereby patterns of behaviour may be 
usefully employed to retroduce the possible structures of the underlying causal mechanisms 
involved, and later, at the stage of theory testing whereby the scientist closes the system to 
interfering mechanisms in order to confirm his/her beliefs, or model, concerning the 
operative structure of the mechanism under investigation. 
In both cases, it is in the closure of the system, in the definitive task of the 
experiment, that an awareness of the relational status of human behaviour becomes 
critically important. For in attempts to isolate particular aspects of human behaviour via 
systems of experimental control - either physical, involving the isolation of the mechanism 
from all others, and/or control, in which a control system is established which reproduces 
the experimental system in all features except the proposed causal mechanism - we run the 
very real lisk of altering the relational nature of the behaviour which defines "what it is". 
Greenwood(l 982) expresses this problem as concerning that of the "artificiality of 
alteration."(p.235) By this he refers to the manner in which 
the removal ... of constitutive social psychological relations [ or the introduction of 
extraneous, 'contaminating' variables] alters the phenomena under 
investigation. (p.243) 
In more traditional terms, this problem may be said to threaten the "construct validity" of 
the behaviour under investigation, that is, it suggests that we may well .!1Q1 be examining 
the construct that we think we are examining. 
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This problem of construct validity, as it concerns the artificiality of alteration, 
therefore demands that social experiments must ensure that successful relational 
reconstructions are achieved within the laboratory in order to ensure the successful 
reproduction of the participants' interpretations and behaviours - and thus, the operation of 
the causal mechanism(s) of interest under inquiry. Within traditional experiments such 
relational concerns are seldom addressed. Instead, more often than not, defining socially 
constitutive relational features of the behavioural context are stripped away, leaving 
experimental settings that are either unrepresentative, or ambiguous in terms of the 
meaningful interpretations that the actors/subjects within them can make. This is not to say 
that full-blown reproductions of the social context are required within the laboratory - for 
this would negate the whole point of performing expedments - but rather, to argue that a 
more anthropologically and sociologically sensitive approach, as promoted by realism, is 
required in order to ensure that the essential features, or relations, of the context are 
maintained. 
While this is undoubtedly an extremely difficult task, in which no simple formulas 
or rules are available to ensure that the abstracted relational structure employed within the 
experimental setting are correct, certain methodological "non-starters" can be identified. 
Foremost amongst these is perhaps the "deception expeliment". For experiments that aim 
to hide, or conceal, from the participants the true purpose of the activities that they are to 
perform have failed to recognise that this "pm-pose" is itself vital to the meanin~s that such 
activities hold for the participants, and thus to what behaviours and mechanisms are 
actually elicited. What experimental subjects think they are doing, how they conceive of 
their experimental situation, and so on, all help to define the behavioms performed and are 
therefore crucial to the valid reproduction of the construct under investigation within the 
experimental setting. Thus, far from disguising, or misrepresenting, the contexts and 
behaviours we wish to study, we should, as far as possible, aim to simulate them along 
with the agents representations according to the known manner in which the relevant 
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actions are constituted. With this purpose in mind, Greenwood(l983,1989) and 
Secord(1990) have proposed the employment, by social psychological experimenters, of an 
"active role-play" or "simulation" methodology as a replacement for the more "relationally 
insensitive" methods of experimental analysis currently in place. 
Sport Psychology's Privileged Position 
While the immediate potential of the foregoing methodological approach is at 
present somewhat limited within most branches of experimental social psychology - due to 
the difficulties involved in abstracting out of the complexities of the various systems which 
relations are relevant or constitutive, which societal structures are implicated, and so forth -
within the more tightly structured world of sport, the current applicability of such an 
approach is, I believe, much greater. That most sporting endeavours are pe1formed, in an 
immediate sense at least, within a semi-closed, highly formalised environment, in which 
overt "rule following" and shared contextual interpretations are necessary for the sporting 
event to occur, means that our potential ability to causally explain such behaviours is 
greatly increased - for several essential aspects of their relational context have been laid, at 
least, partially bare. Experimental sport psychology is thus privileged in that in certain 
relevant ways it is more readily able to create experimental contexts that accurately reflect 
many of the structures of its co1Tesponding real life situation such that the athletes 
meaningful interpretations remain constant across the two conditions. 
Consequently, our understanding of psychological sporting constructs such as 
anxiety, motivation, concentration, aggression, and so on, which have traditionally been 
investigated in isolation from their constituent causal relations, thereby creating 
misrepresentations of their natures, are well positioned to benefit from the employment of 
more "contextually sensitive" methodologies. The potential for significant advancements in 
our sporting understandings of such complex constructions, by the adoption of such 
contextualising strategies, is then, enormous. 
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In practical terms, the employment of, for example, Greenwood's(l983) "active 
experimental role playing" procedure, would involve, firstly, the identification of the 
definitive relational aspects of the context, here relatively easily isolated due to sports more 
rigidly defined, quasi-closed structure; and secondly, the construction of various scripts, 
each of which maintains the key relational aspects previously identified, while 
simultaneously manipulating some theoretically relevant aspect of a real life situation. 
Participants then act out each of these scripts with their actions and interpretations being 
used to retroduce the likely nature of the causal strnctures responsible for their production. 
In addition, the contextual manipulations this method enables, allows the nature of 
interfering causal mechanisms to be identified; that is, it allows the identification of those 
features of the context which significantly impact upon the operation of the construct of 
interest. Thus, Greenwood(1983) concludes that the merits of such an experimental 
approach lie in that it can 
achieve isolation without alteration, and by the progressive reconstruction of social 
situations, conditions that generate and prevent social behaviours can be identified, 
as well as factors which alter the relational nature of social situations.(p.249) 
Note, however, that in the case of sport psychology there exists the potential to go 
even further in the experimental reconstruction of relevant relational aspects of the context. 
For here it is quite possible to take Greenwood's strategy of "scripting scenarios", and to 
employ it directly within situations where the sport is being practiced, that is, "rehearsed". 
This has the advantage of allowing the construct of interest to be studied in a relationally 
near ideal situation, while still enabling the investigator to exert certain controls of closure 
over the experimental context. Thus, for example, sport anxiety may be studied within the 
setting of "practice" games, with anxiety inducing factors being artificially imposed via the 
scripting of different scenarios for the players. In this way, the likely retroduction to 
various causal reasons, beliefs, structures and attributions are given greatly increased 
"construct validity" from those derived from more traditional methods. 
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Thus, one of the most difficult problems facing social experimental research, that of 
maintaining the constituent relational structures of a construct while simultaneously 
attempting to isolate it from interference from extraneous causal mechanisms, is more 
readily resolvable within sport psychology, due in part to its nature, and in part to the 
redefined goals, and thus methods, realism has established as being appropriate for 
science. 
More generally, then, the alternative philosophy of realism may be seen to have 
suggested a whole plethora of advantages to the realm of sport psychology, both at the 
level of its structures as a discipline and at that of its practices as a science. By 
reconceiving of science as the employment of those methods that enable the development of 
practically adequate knowledge through the production of causal-explanatory models of the 
world, realism is able to employ a multiplicity of rational methods in the achievement of 
this end. The rationality of the method thus becomes a matter of how their employment is 
consistent with the objectives of research defined by realist thinking. By these criteria, the 
two schools of sport psychology, which contain highly different methods and immediate 
objectives, when placed under this common philosophical umbrella become intelligible as 
representing different methodologies concerned with examining complementruy questions. 
Under these terms, the prevailing atmosphere of mutual distrust and competitive jealousy is 
not only unnecessary, but nonsensical. Thus, realism gives us substantial grounds for 
optimism for it suggests that, if adopted, competition should quickly fade into co-
operation, and further, that given the privileged position sport psychology holds due to the 
structured nature of its context of concern, a virtual 'Aladdin's cave' of treasures is 
potentially ours for the taking. 
Poststructuralism Revisited 
In order to be consistent with the earlier assertions that it is only through critical 
self-examination that we might ward off the temptations of dogmatism, and thereby, 
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continue to evolve, it now becomes rational to consider the adequacy of the above realist 
programme for sport psychology in terms of the deconstructionist 'method' outlined 
earlier. The benefits of such an approach lie chiefly in its ability to inform us where our 
constructions may be ideologically founded by criteria that exist outside of our stated frame 
of reference - that is, outside of what realism contends is rationally acceptable. 
Initially, it is useful to note that deconstructive 'method', if applied to the tenets of 
empiricist philosophy - as indeed it has been by theorists such as Denida(1978), and 
Norris(l982) - would come to essentially similar conclusions to those drawn by the realist 
analysis outlined earlier. Though the path of its logic is somewhat different, based as it is 
upon an examination of empilicism's unjustified privileging of the notion of truth as the 
foundation for its consequent method and practice, its overall critique is similar. Further, 
although many poststructural the01ists would seek to deconstruct realist theory upon similar 
grounds, it is contended here that realism's acknowledgement of the potentially fallible 
nature of all knowledge, and the fact that it seeks only to construct systems of meaning that 
may prove "practically adequate" for guiding our behaviour in the world, effectively 
deflects such criticisms. 
An examination of further concepts, or constructs, that may be unjustifiably 
privileged within realist analysis, and which may, therefore, have disquieting ramifications 
upon its structure as a whole, does however, uncover some potential concerns that may not 
be so easily explained away. I refer, in particular, to realism's founding concepts of 
rationality, pragmatism and explanation, which, in the light of a growing body of feminist 
discourses on the nature of science are often seen to represent reflections of patriarchal 
ideology more that 'rational' features of science. While the 'truth', or adequacy of such 
feminist analysis remains a contentious issue, the deconstruction of realist theory, even at 
the very superficial level at which I have invoked it here, does provide us with the insight 
that feminist theory could potentially inform realism's philosophy in valuable ways. It is 
contended here, without wishing to delve any deeper into the issue at this time, that similar 
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deconstruction at a more specific level within particular causal theories and models, 
particularly the social psychological models employed within sport psychology, may prove 
equally useful. 
Conclusion 
The analysis contained in the preceding pages continually reiterates the main theme 
of this thesis, that being the existence of an inherent link between adequate philosophical 
conceptions of science and the consequent adequacy of the theory and method it produces 
when incorporated into disciplinary practice. The historical privileging of empiricism 
within the structures of scientific psychology can thus be seen to achieve the exact opposite 
of what its proponents believe themselves to be achieving when they champion it exclusive 
employment. That is, because of its unrealistic expectations concerning the structure of 
reality and our presumed accessibility to this structure, empiricism destroys its own 
viability as an adequate conception of scientific method, and thus, so too does it invalidate 
the scientific claims of those who base their method upon it. Under these terms, then, it 
was shown how empiricist psychology in fact cannot be considered to represent a science. 
In the search for alternatives to this philosophical doctrine it was demonstrated how 
the epistemic and ontological claims, or analysis, of realist theory position it as being 
empiricisms most likely, or at least strongest, successor. Not only theoretically was 
realism found to be superior to the foibled claims of empiricist thinking, but also in the 
concrete realm, in the analysis of sport psychology, it was found to be capable of undoing 
much of the harm empiricism had already wrecked! 
In addition to such theoretically based claims, the foregoing analysis also provided 
a long overdue analysis of the unnecessarily divided discipline of sport psychology, and 
concluded that with relatively minor "physical" adjustments to its current mode of practice 
(though major conceptual changes in thinking are required!), this discipline is in fact well 
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positioned, and in many ways uniquely positioned, to make major advancements in its 
proposed area of investigation. 
Finally, the need for continual self-monitoring should be restated, and the potential 
of the modem development of poststructuralism, as an effectual means of achieving this 
goal, and indeed perhaps of providing relevant critical insights onto all our proposed 
theories and models, confirmed. 
In closing, it should be apparent to the reader that despite the continued reliance 
upon dogma that permeates much academic research and enterprise, the continually fresh 
insights being offered by a variety of sources in the area of method and theory provide 
substantial grounds for optimism about the future. 
72 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alde1man, R.B. (1980), 'Sport psychology: past, present, and future dilemmas', in P. 
Klavora and K.A.W. Wipper (eds.), Psychological and Sociological Factors in 
,SilQrt, Toronto: University of Toronto 
(1984), 'The future of sport psychology' in J.M. Silva and R.S. Weinberg 
(eds.), Psychological Foundations of Sport, Champaign, Il.: Human Kinetics 
Barnes, B. (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge and 
KeganPaul 
(1977), Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 
Bernstein, R.J. (1976), The Restmcturing of Social and Political Theozy. Oxford: 
Blackwell 
Bhaskar, R. (1975), A Realist Theozy of Science, Leeds: Leeds Books 
(1976), 'Two philosophies of science', New Left Review. 94 
(1979), The Possibility of Naturalism, Hassocks: Harvester 
Blackbum, R. (1972), Ideology and Social Science, London: Fontana 
Bourdieu, P. (1981), 'Men and Machines', in K. Knon--Cetina and A.V. Cicourel 
(eds.),.Advances in Social Theozy and Methodology: Towards an Interi,n:ation of 
Micro-Macro-Sociologies, Boston: Routledge 
Briggs, J.P. and Peat, F.D (1984), Looking Glass Universe: the Emerging Science of 
Wholeness, New York: Simon and Schuster 
Campbell, D.T. (1978), 'Qualitative knowing in action research', in M. Brenner, P. 
Marsh and M. Brenner (eds.), The Social Context of Method, London: Croom 
Helm 
Davids, K. (1988), 'Ecological Validity in Understanding Sp01t Performance: Some 
problems of definition', ~,40, 126-136 
Denida,J. (1978), Writing and Difference, (trans.) Alan Bass, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
Dishman, R.K. (1982), 'Contemporary sport psychology', in Exercise and Sport Sciences 
Reviews, 10, pp.120-159 
(1983), 'Identity crises in North American spmt psychology: academics in 
professional issues', in Journal of Sp01t Psychology 5, pp.123-134 
Dishman, R.K.,Ickes, W.J., and Morgan, W.P. (1980), 'Self-motivation and adherence 
to habitual physical activity', Journal Of Applied Social Psychology 10, pp.115-
131 
73 
Fay, B. (1975), Social Theory and Political Practice, London: George Allen and Unwin 
Feltz, D. L. (1986 ), 'Theoretical research in sport psychology: from applied psychology 
toward sport science' in J.S. Skinner, Future Directions in Exercise and Sport 
Science Research, 
(1987), 'Advancing knowledge in sport psychology: strategies for expanding our 
conceptual frameworks', ~,1987, 39. pp.243-254 
(1988), 'Gender differences in the causal elements in Bandura's theory of self-
efficacy on a high-avoidance motor task', Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psycholo1rn. 10, pp.155-166 
Feltz, D.L. and Albrecht, R.R, (1986), 'Psychological implications of competitive 
running', in M. Weiss and D. Gould (eds.) Sport for Children and Youths, 
pp.225-230 Champaign, 11.: Human Kinetics 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. ( 1971 ), The EntrQl)y Law and the Economic Process, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Gelwick, R. (1977), The Way of Discovery: An Introduction to the Thou&ht of Michael 
Polanyi, New York: Oxford University Press 
Gergen, K.J. (1985), 'Social constructionist inquiry: context and implications', in K.J 
Gergen and K.E. Davis (eds). The Social Construction of the Person, New 
York: Sptinger-Verlag 
(1986) 'Correspondence versus autonomy in the language of understanding 
human action', in D.W Fiske and R.A. Shweder (eds.) Methodolo&y in Social 
Science, Chicago: Chicago University Press 
Giddens, A. (1981), A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, London: 
Macmillan 
Goffman, E. (1981), 'The Presentation of Self, in D. Potter et al., Society and the Social 
Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Greenwood, J.D. (1982), 'On the relation between laboratory experiments and social 
behaviour: causal explanations and generalization', Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour, 1982, 12.3, pp.225-250 
(1983), 'Rak-playing as a experimental strategy in social psychology', European 
Journal of Social Psycholo~y. 13, pp.235-254 
(1989), Explanation and Experiment in Social Science; Realism and the Social 
Constitution of Action, New York: Springer-Verlag 
Gill, D.L. (1981), 'Current research and future prospects in sport psychology', in G.A. 
Brooks(ed), Perspectives on the Academic Discipline of Physical Education, 
lliinois: Human Kinetics 
74 
Habermas, J. (1972), Knowledge and the Human Interests, London: Heinemann 
Harre, R. (1970), The Principles of Scientific Thinking. London: Macmillan 
(1972), The Philosophies of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Harre, R. and Madden,E.G. (1975), Causal Powers, Oxford: Blackwell 
Harre, R. and Secord, P.F. (1972), The Explanation of Social Behaviour, Oxford, 
Blackwell 
Held, D. (1980), Introduction to Critical Theory. London: Hutchinson 
Hesse, M. (1980), Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science, 
Hassocks: Harvester 
Irvine, J., Miles, I. and Evans, J. (eds.) (1979), Demysterfying Social Statistics, London: 
Pluto 
Jefferson,A. and Robey,D. (1982), Modern Literary The01y. London: Batsford 
Keat, R. (1979), 'Positivism and statistics in social science', in J. Irvine, I. Miles and J. 
Evans (eds.), Demysterfying Social Statistics, London: Pluto 
Keat, R. and Urry, J. (1975), Social The01y as Science. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 
Kuhn, T. (1970), The Structure of Social Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
Lakatos, I. (1970), 'Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes', 
in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1976), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Landers, D.M. (1983), 'Whatever happened to theory testing in sport psychology?', 
Journal of Sport Psychology, 5, 77-90 
(1986), 'Sport psychology: A commentary', in J.S. Sinner et al, Future 
Directions in Exercise and Sports Science Research, Tempe:Arizona 
Landers, D.M., Boutcher,S., and Wang, M.Q. (1986) "A report on the research submitted 
to the Journal of Sp01t Psychology. Journal of Sport Psychology 8(3),149-163 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1976), The Savage Mind, London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson 
Lyons, J. (1981), Language. Meaning and Context, London: Fontana 
Manicas, P.T. (1981), Review of States and Social Revolutions, By T. Skocpol, History 
and Theocy. 20, 204-218 
(1986), 'Whither psychology?', in J. Margolis, P.T. Manicas, R. Harre, and 
P.F. Secord (eds.), Psychology: Designing the Discipline. Oxford: Blackwell 
75 
Manicas, P.T. and Secord, P.F. (1983), 'Implications for psychology of the new 
philosophy of science', in American Psychologist, April, 1983, 399-413 
Martens, R. (1975), 'The paradigmatic crisis in American sport personology', 
Sportwissenschaft, 5, 9-24 
(1980), 'From smocks to jocks: A new adventure for sport psychologists' in P. 
Klavora and K. Wipper(eds.), Psychological and Sociological Factors in Sport. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
(!987), 'Science, Knowledge, and Sport Psychology', The Sport Psychologist 
1, pp.29-55 
Marx, K. (1976), Capital. vol.1, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Meikle, S. (1979), 'Dialectical contradiction and necessity', in J. Mepham and D.-H. 
Ruben (eds.), Issues in Marxist Philosophy: Volume 1. Dialectics and Method, 
Hassocks: Harvester 
Morgan, W.P. (1986), 'Sport Psychology in its own context: A recommendation for the 
future', in J.S. Skinner et al, Future Directions in Exercise and Sport Science 
Research, Tempe: Arizona 
Nonis, C. (1982), Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, London: Methuen 
Oakly, A. (1981), 'Interviewing women: a contradiction in terms', in H. Roberts (ed.), 
Doing Feminist Research, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
O'Connor, D. J. 0 and Can-, B. (1982), Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Hassock: Harvester 
Polanyi, M. (1964), Personal Knowledge. New York: Harper and Row 
(1967), The Tacit Dimension, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Popper, K. R. (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovezy, London: Hutchinson 
Pratt, V. (1980), The Philosophy of Social Science, London: Tavistock 
Quine, W. V. 0. (1961), From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press 
Ricouer, P. (1976), 'Restoration of meaning or reduction of illusion', in P. Connerton, 
Critical Sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Roberts, G.C. (1986), 'When motivation matters: the need to expand the conceptual 
model', in J.S. Skinner et al, . Future Directions in Exercise and Sport Science 
Research, Tempe: A1izona University Press 
Sartre, J.-P. (1963), Search for a Method, New York: Vintage Books 
Sayer, A (1981), 'Abstraction: a realist interpretation', Radical Philosophy. 28, pp.6-15 
(1984), Method in Social Science: a Realist Approach, London: Hutchinson 
76 
Secord, P.F. (1990), 'The need for a radically new human science', Annals of Theoretical 
Psycholo&y, 6, pp.75-87 
Skinner, B. F. (1972), Beyond Freedom and Di&nity. London: Jonathan Cape 
Suinn, R.M. (1980), 'Psychology and sports performance:Principles and applications', in 
R. Suinn(ed), Psycholo&y in sp01ts: Methods and applications, Minneapolis: 
Burgess 
(1986), 'Models from behavioural clinical psychology for sport psychology', in 
J.S. Skinner, et al, Future Directions in Exercise and Sport Science Research, 
Tempe:Arizona 
Toulmin, S. (1982), 'The genealogy of consciousness', in P.F. Secord (ed.), Explaining 
Social Behaviour: Consciousness, Human Action and Social Structure. Beverly 
Hills: Sage 
UITy, J. (1981), The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, London: Macmillan 
Vealy, R.S.(1989), 'Sport personology: A pragmatic and methodological analysis', 
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psycholo&Y· 1989,11, 216-235 
Willis, P. (1978), Profane Culture, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Winch, P. (1958), The Idea of Social Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922), Tractatus Lo&i,co-Philosophocus, London: Kegan and Paul 
77 
